As we approach the closing phases of Sefiras Ha-Omer, we dedicate the present article to completing the discussion we began two weeks ago concerning onaas devarim – causing pain and anguish by means of offensive words.
In the previous article we saw the gravity of the prohibition against onaas devarim, and discussed some of its halachic details: Is the offense punishable by Beis Din, is it permitted to offend somebody in self-defense or in retaliation, and which people are singled out for special care in this area?
In the present article we will discuss some of the concrete cases noted by Chazal in connection with the prohibition, and derive practical lessons for understanding the matter. What type of emotional pain does the prohibition of onaas devarim include? Does the prohibition depend on a person’s intentions? Is it forbidden to call a person by a nickname? These questions, and more, are discussed below.
Shopping With Care
The primary source for the prohibition of onaas devarim is the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 58), which notes a number of cases in which the prohibition is transgressed.
The Mishnah teaches that one may not ask a shopkeeper “how much is this item” when in fact there is no intent of buying it. In a similar sense, one must not pore over a particular item, giving an impression of interest in purchasing it, whereas in fact the person lacks the money to buy it. This halachah is ruled by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:4; interestingly, the Rambam makes no mention of it).
Commentaries suggest several reasons for this prohibition. The Meiri explains that when other people are present in the shop, they will receive an impression that the item is not worth its price, and the shopkeeper will lose his business. According to this, the issue is not related to emotional harm, but rather to causing financial damage (see also Rashbam, Pesachim 112b).
However, this interpretation is difficult in view of the placement of the teaching – in a Mishnah dealing with onaas devarim (emotional, rather than financial harm). Presumably for this reason the Meiri adds that even when there are no other customers in the store, the prohibition remains, since the action causes the storekeeper grief.
The straightforward understanding of this grief is that the vendor, who justifiably sees a potential sale, is disappointed. However, the Rach (Pesachim 112b) explains that the item is devalued in the eyes of the vendor, causing him grief.
The example given by the Mishnah commonly occurs after someone has already completed a purchase, but wishes to compare prices to check out if he made a good deal or not. Because he has no intent of buying another item, it is forbidden to inquire in a store about prices, unless it is made clear there is no desire to actually buy the product, and only to procure information.
In large chain-stores and supermarkets the prohibition is less applicable, since the vendors are typically not the owners, and have little to gain or lose from the quantity of sales. An exception to this, however, is a store in which the vendor has to prove his salesman skills (such as clothing retailers), so that losing sales will be disappointing.
Remembering Past (Mis)Deeds
A further example given by the Mishnah is that of a Baal Teshuvah, to whom one may not say, “remember your deeds of old.”
The prohibition applies to all similar cases in which a person will be pained to remember something. For instance, the Gemara (59b) teaches that if one of the family members was hung as punishment for some crime, the word ‘hang’ should not be spoken to family members, even in the context of “hanging up a fish.”
The issue of past misdeeds is especially relevant when one wishes to rebuke or discipline somebody else, such as a mashgiach who is concerned about a particular boy in yeshiva. The Gemara states that if someone experiences suffering and hardship, it is wrong to emulate the ways of Iyov’s friends, who reminded him that punishment is always meted out for some without sin. Thus, a mashgiach must be wary of causing the student unnecessary distress even if his motives are good.
The Question of Intent
In some cases, however, it is impossible to give effective rebuke without hurting a person’s feelings, and in these cases it is nonetheless permitted to give the rebuke, provided that one’s intentions are pure. This is comparable with the prohibition of lashon hara, which is waived in cases of need and where there is no way of avoiding the issue.
Thus a mashgiach, whose intent is purely for the good of the student, is not guilty of causing onaas devarim if the circumstances are such that it cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, he should carefully check that his intentions are pure, that there is no trace of malice in his admonition and that the student is not embarassed.
Certainly, one must always be wary of causing unnecessary insult. Carelessness in aggrieving others is a sign of inner apathy towards others’ feelings, and a sure transgression of onaas devarim. The Chinuch (238) thus warns us to take care lest the nuances of our speech cause another grief, and the Maharam Schick (chiddushim, end of Perek Hazahav) writes explicitly that a person transgresses the prohibition even if he inadvertently hurt another.
Moreover, we actually find several instances in which people were punished for causing others grief, despite the purity of their intentions. A classic example of this is the story of Chanah and Peninah. Although Chazal teach that Peninah has positive intentions in humiliating Chanah, these did not save her from the tragic consequence of her children’s deaths. Similarly, we have already mentioned the sad story of Rav Rechumi (Kesubos 62b) who fell to his death after inadvertently causing his wife to cry over his absence. A further instance is the case of Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol, whose distress, after being placed in excommunication, had global repercussions (Bava Metiza 59b)
Thus, even well-meaning onaas devarim must be avoided. Only when it is absolutely imperative should the step of aggrieving our fellow – without malicious intention of course – be taken.
Asking Good Questions
Another example of causing shame is asking questions of somebody who will clearly be unable to provide the answer. The Shulchan Aruch (228:4) mentions this circumstance, pointing out that great care must be taken to avoid causing distress or shame.
Following similar lines, the Sefer Chassidim (312) instructs a host to avoid questioning his guest in matters of Divrei Torah, unless he is sure that the guest is capable of providing the goods.
Even when a Rav is giving a Shiur, Talmidim may ask questions only after the Rav has collected his thoughts, and should restrict their questions to matters currently being studied, for fear of embarrassing or distressing the Rav. Naturally, this halachah is somewhat flexible, depending on the circumstances and on the nature of the Rav in question.
At the same time, a Rav may use the tool of questioning in order to gauge his students’ knowledge, and to sharpen their minds (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 246:12; this does not involve a transgression of geneivas daas or sheker).
Types of Pain
The cases above relate to the ‘classic’ instances of onnas devarim – causing shame, embarrassment or deep distress. But what of causing shocks or fear? Do these emotions also fall under the category of onaas devarim, or not?
For instance, consider a case of a mischievous boy who promises his friend that a particular food tastes great, whereas in fact it is quite sordid. Is the ‘distress’ of this unpleasant surprise also classified as onaas devarim or not? Moreover, what about causing discomfort? Does somebody who smokes in the vicinity of others, thereby causing them discomfort (aside from potential health damage), breach the prohibition of onaas devarim?
We can ask the question as follows: Does every case of causing unpleasantness fall under the category of onaas devarim, or is the transgression limited to particular forms of emotional pain?
Disturbing Sleep
Citing from the Keren Le-David (Orach Chaim 18), who writes that somebody who wakes up someone else transgresses the prohibition of ‘distressing’ another, the Eimek Ha-Mishpat (Chap. 35) suggests that disturbing someone from his sleep is a full transgression of onaas devarim. Although far removed from the classic cases of causing shame, even the discomfort of being woken up is included in the prohibition. We also find Rashi in Parshas Behar who writes that giving bad advice is a violation of the prohibition of ono’as devorim. Also the Rambam (Sefer Ha-Mitzvos 251) includes ‘angering’ somebody else, in the prohibition. The Rambam thus continues: “He warned us from aggrieving one another through words, by speaking in a manner that will pain and anger him, and he will not be able to answer back for his shame.”
Calling Names
Another branch of onaas devarim is known as mechaneh shem le-chaveiro – calling another by a ‘name.’
The Gemara (Bava Metzia 58b) mentions three individuals who are doomed to descend eternally to Gehinom – unlike other sinners, who are ultimately destined to rise up. Two of the three categories are related to onaas devarim. One of them – somebody who embarrasses another in public – can be understood at face value: The Gemara teaches that publicly shaming somebody is akin to killing him, and the severity of the deed is well understood. The other, however – someone who “calls his fellow by a bad name” – is harder to comprehend.
The Gemara explains that calling somebody a name is distinct from shaming him, because it applies even if the person has already become accustomed to the name. Although no actual shame is caused, the prohibition against calling him by the name remains – to the degree that the offender is punished by eternal descent to Gehinom, Heaven forbid. Why, however, does calling a person by a name (that he is already accustomed to) carry such stringency?
Rashi understands the severity of the transgression as relating to negative intentions: Although the victim was not shamed, the intention was nonetheless to embarrass him.
Based on the Gemara in Megillah (27b), there is a virtue of calling a person by his true given name, rather than using a nickname, even if the nickname is not in any way offensive (see also Yefei Lev, Vol. 5, Yoreh De’ah 242). Certainly, one must be careful to avoid using a nickname bearing a negative connotation.
