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A Jewish Shabbos-Goy: Asking others to do labor

A Jewish Shabbos-Goy:
Asking a Friend to Perform an Act of Labor on Shabbos

In this week’s parashah, Parashas Vayishlach, Chazal find the first mention of keeping Shabbos by one of  the Avos. On the verse (Bereishis 33:18), “and he camped before the city,” the Midrash writes: “He arrived as the sun was setting, and he established the techum while it was still day.”

The mention of techumin recalls an important and pertinent principle of the laws of Shabbos.

As we know, many laws of Shabbos involve disputes among authorities, and these disputes lead, in some instances, to different customs: Some are lenient, and some are stringent. The question is thus raised: Is it permitted for somebody who is stringent concerning a particular issue to ask his friend who is lenient on the same point, to do the relevant act on Shabbos?

A familiar circumstance in which this question arises is the matter of opening bottles on Shabbos. Contemporary authorities have different opinions about opening various bottle tops on Shabbos. Some prohibit all bottle tops (that leave a ring behind), some permit, and some make a distinction between metal caps and plastic caps. Can somebody who refrains from opening bottle tops ask his friend who does, to open the bottle for him?

Another frequently raised question is in relying on an eiruv. Can somebody who does not rely on an eiruv ask somebody who relies on the eiruv to carry  something out on Shabbos?

We will seek to clarify this important issue in this article.

Watching Over Produce Outside the Techum

The Gemara (Shabbos 151a) cites a halachic ruling in the name of Shmuel: “It is permitted for somebody to tell his friend: Guard my produce in your techum, and I will guard your produce in my techum.”

The Gemara refers to somebody who cannot leave his own techum (two thousand cubits outside the town) to watch over his produce to prevent it from being stolen or damaged. The halachah of Shmuel states that it is permitted for him to ask his friend, for whom no prohibition is involved (he lives near the produce), to guard his produce for him. This principle is ruled by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 307:10).

Rishonim are divided over the rationale behind the halachah. According to the Ran (Shabbos 64b), the reason is that the owner can theoretically guard his own produce. If huts were to be placed outside the town, thereby extending the boundary of the techum Shabbos, the owner would himself be able to go and guard his produce. Because of this theoretical possibility, it is permitted for the owner to ask his friend to guard the produce.

The Rashba (Shabbos 151a, citing Tosafos), however, writes that the reason for the halachah is that the friend’s guarding involves no transgression. Because it is permitted for the friend to guard the produce, it is likewise permitted for the owner of the produce to ask him to do it.

Asking a Friend to Perform a Melachah after Accepting Shabbos

Based on their interpretation of the above Gemara, the Tosafos, as cited by the Rashba, writes that it is permitted for somebody who has accepted Shabbos early to ask his friend who has not yet accepted Shabbos, to perform an act of labor for him. Because the friend’s act of labor involves no transgression, it follows that even somebody who has accepted Shabbos can ask him to perform it.

Yet the Ran, based on his interpretation of the Gemara, writes that no proof can be brought for this ruling. According to the Ran, it is possible that after having accepted Shabbos, a person may not ask his friend to perform a prohibited act for him. Unlike the techum Shabbos, which can be extended by huts, there is no possibility of permitting a prohibited act of labor after Shabbos has been accepted.

The Shulchan Aruch (263:17) rules that it is permitted for somebody who has accepted Shabbos to ask his friend to perform a forbidden act. He adds that the same ruling applies on Motza’ei Shabbos (It is permitted for somebody who has not yet made havdalah to ask somebody who has made havdalah to perform an act of Shabbos labor.). This ruling appears to be in line with the above-mentioned Rashba: Since the friend’s act involves no prohibition for the Jew who is performing the act, it is permitted to ask him to do it.

Yet, the Magen Avraham (263:30, based on the Beis Yosef) suggests that the ruling does not necessarily contradict the rationale given by the Ran. Although a proscribed labor cannot be performed after accepting Shabbos, the actual acceptance of Shabbos is contingent on a person’s decision. Because he could have chosen to delay his acceptance of Shabbos, that may be the reason that there is no prohibition to ask somebody else to perform the labor.

The Taz (263:3) disagrees with this argument, and writes that the rationale of the Rashba is the only reason it is permitted to ask a friend to perform labor. The Mishnah Berurah (263:64) specifically cites the Taz, and the Bach (263) and Shulchan Aruch Harav (263:25) also concur.[1]

The Second Day of Yom Kippur

A seeming contradiction to the above halachah appears in a halachah related to Yom Kippur.

The Tur (Orach Chaim 624) mentions a custom of the especially pious to observe two days of Yom Kippur. Just like the two-day observance of festivals outside Israel, some observe a two-day Yom Kippur, fasting for a continuous 48-hour period.

The Tur raises the question of having somebody who observes only one day of Yom Kippur perform an act of labor on the second day of Yom Kippur on behalf of those who are keeping two days. The question arises in full force when Yom Kippur falls on Thursday. Can somebody who is not observing two days of Yom Kippur cook for Shabbos on behalf of somebody observing two days?

The ruling of the Tur, citing form Ri Ha-Levi, is that this is forbidden. This ruling is also cited by the Mishnah Berurah (624:16).

Based on the above interpretation of the Magen Avraham, this ruling does not contradict the lenient ruling concerning somebody who has already accepted Shabbos. Whereas somebody who has accepted Shabbos had the option of not accepting Shabbos, somebody who is stringent concerning the second day of Yom Kippur had no option of leniency. Since he must observe two days according to his stringent approach, it follows that he cannot ask his friend, who does not observe two days, to perform labor for him.

According to other authorities, however, who follow the Rashba, the ruling of Yom Kippur appears difficult: Why is it not permitted for somebody observing the second day of Yom Kippur to ask somebody who observed only one day to perform labor on his behalf?

The Taz (loc. cit.) notes this difficulty, and answers that there is a fundamental difference between the cases. Even before I have made havdalah, I acknowledge that it is fully permitted for somebody who has already made havdalah to perform all acts of labor. Although labor is prohibited for me, it is permitted for others, and when I ask another to perform a labor I ask him to do something that is entirely permitted.

In contradistinction, if I observe two days of Yom Kippur, my approach implies that performing labor on the day possibly involves a universal transgression—the prohibition does not apply to me any more than to others. Therefore, when I ask somebody else to perform a labor, even though he is personally lenient, this cannot be considered a request of a permitted act of labor (see also Magen Avraham 33).

Opening Bottles by Means of Others

Based on the principles outlined above, it appears that it is not permitted for somebody who is stringent concerning opening bottles on Shabbos to ask somebody else to open a bottle for him.

Based on the rationale of the Taz, it follows that if I see the action as being universally prohibited (there is no special reason why it should be permitted for one Jew to open bottles and not for others), I may not ask somebody who is lenient to perform the action. Of course, according to the Magen Avraham there is no room for leniency, because there is no way in which it is permitted for me to open bottles on Shabbos.

A similar ruling is given by the Tzitz Eliezer (18:32). The Tzitz Eliezer was asked whether a Sephardic Jew, who is stringent concerning reheating liquids that have cooled, can ask an Ashkenazi Jew, who is lenient (provided the liquid hasn’t cooled completely; see 318:15) to reheat the liquid for him.

His answer, which he bases on the Magen Avraham, is that it is prohibited. Unlike the prohibition on labor after accepting Shabbos, the prohibition of reheating soup does not depend on any personal factor, and therefore somebody who is stringent based on the Shulchan Aruch, cannot ask somebody who is lenient to perform the labor for him.

Asking an Israeli to Perform Labor on Yom Tov Sheini

Is it permitted for somebody living outside Israel, but present in Israel for Yom Tov, to ask an Israeli to perform labor for him on the second day of Yom Tov?

According to the Ran and the Magen Avraham, it appears that one may not do so. The Iggros Moshe (Orach Chaim 3:73) explains that with regard to this halachah, we do not say that a resident of chutz la-aretz has the practical possibility of turning himself into a resident of Israel. Such a decision is not made lightly, and as a resident of chutz la-aretz, it is considered as though the person does not have the option of permitting the labor for himself.

Therefore, the Iggros Moshe concludes that it is forbidden for a resident of chutz la-aretz to ask a resident of Israel to perform labor for him.

However, according to the Rashba and the Taz, it appears that no prohibition is involved. The prohibition of performing labor on the second day of Yom Tov is not universal: It applies specifically to residents of chutz la-aretz, and not to residents of Israel, for whom it is entirely permitted to perform the labor.

Based on the Rashba, the Pischei Teshuva (496:2) cites the Maharikash that it is permitted for a ben chutz la-aretz to ask a resident of Israel to perform labor on his behalf. However, the Pischei Teshuvah continues to cite authorities who do not concur, and prohibit asking an Israeli to perform labor on Yom Tov Sheini.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:19) explains why there is room for stringency even according to the Rashba. This is because it is possible that the enactment of the second day of Yom Tov is that the day should be actually considered as a safek Yom Tov. If one must regard the day as possibly being Yom Tov, it follows that he cannot ask others, even an Israeli, to perform a prohibited act of labor.

The leaning of Rav Shlomo Zalman is that it is permitted to ask a resident of Israel to perform labor, but he concludes that he does not permit this in practice, but he wishes only to explain the practice of those who are lenient.

The Minchas Yitzchak (7:34) rules stringently on the question, and Rav Elyashiv shlita (Kovetz Teshuvos 1:54), though writing that the prohibition of instructing others does not apply, writes that asking a resident of Israel involves a problem of speaking about prohibited acts of labor on Yom Tov and therefore, is generally prohibited.

Deriving Benefit from Labor of Others

Although we have noted that it is often forbidden for somebody who is stringent to ask others who are lenient to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbos, it is important to note that once the labor is performed, it is permitted for all to derive benefit from it.

The reason for this is that with regard to deriving benefit from maaseh Shabbos, we are lenient in cases of dispute. Because the person who performed the labor relied on halachic opinions that permit the act, it follows that there is no prohibition of deriving benefit from the labor (see Mishnah Berurah 318:2).

Therefore, if an Ashkenazi family is invited to dine with a Yemenite family which has the custom of heating cold soup on Shabbos morning (though not on a direct fire; the leniency is based on the ruling of the Rambam), there is no prohibition in partaking of the soup. Although it is not permitted to instruct a Yemenite to do this, there is no problem in deriving benefit (see Menuchas Ahavah 1:25:13). The same applies to bottles that others have already opened (see Iggros Moshe, Orach Chaim Vol. 2, no. 119, sec. 5).

A difficulty with the above ruling is the fact that the Tur (loc. cit.) notes that somebody observing the second day of Yom Kippur cannot derive benefit from labor performed by those who are lenient. This indicates that even where the matter is under dispute, somebody who acts stringently cannot derive benefit from labor performed by those who act leniently.

The sefer Deror Yikra (p. 466) notes this difficulty. He suggests (also citing Rav Elyashiv shlita and Rav Chaim Kanievsky shlita) that a distinction can be made between different levels of stringency. Somebody who considers a prohibition to be definite , like the people who keep two days of Yom Kippur, may not derive benefit from the act of labor, even if others are lenient. It is only with regard to stringencies that are not accepted as definite prohibitions that a person may derive benefit from the labor of those who are lenient.


[1]               Note that according to the Levush, it is forbidden to ask a friend to perform a proscribed act of labor after Shabbos is accepted. Yet, other authorities defer his ruling from halachah. See Mishnah Berurah 263:67; Kaf Hachayim 263:102.

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