The sefer Tochachas Mussar (Introduction) records a fascinating anecdote involving the great Maharsha. According to the tale, two business partners and close friends, one of whom had committed a grave sin as part of a business deal, had come to an arrangement between them. The person who committed the sin would sell his “sin” to the other partner, in exchange for his portion in the deal. The deal was struck, and an official kinyan made upon it.
After the buyer (the person who had “bought” the sin) passed away, the seller began to suffer from nightmares in which his fried appeared to him and invited him to appear before the heavenly tribunal, on account of the sin he had committed. The friend explained that he was suffering on account of the sin, though he had never committed it, and asked his friend (the seller) to take responsibility for his actions before the tribunal.
The friend, who was shocked by the recurring vision, took the case to the Maharsha, who declared that the question should be brought before Beis Din. Buyer and seller – seller in person, and buyer in spirit – appeared at the appointed time, and the Maharsha duly ruled that the sale was binding, and that the seller had no responsibility for the sin he had committed. He was never disturbed by his departed friend again.
The present article is dedicated to the discussion of transaction in reward and punishment. This topic is inspired by the YissacharZevulun partnership, which we have discussed in the past in connection with the special roles of these two tribes.
Can the concept of the YissacharZevulun arrangement be a source for the idea of buying and selling reward? Are there in fact different types of reward for this matter? Which other sources indicate that reward and punishment can be transferred? As we will see below, there are in fact different schools of thought concerning this fascinating matter.
The Yissachar-Zevulun Partnership
As noted, a possible source for the idea of selling and buying eternal reward is the Yissachar-Zevulun arrangement, which we have discussed at length in the past. By donating to the cause of Yissachar’s Torah study, Zevulun seems to be effectively buying a portion in Yissachar’s eternal reward.
However, we find in the Gemara (Sotah 21a) that that the stipulation whereby Zevulun shares his income with Yissachar, and Yissachar his Torah study with Zevulun, must be made in advance. This principle is ruled by the Beis Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 246) in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham, and cited by the Rema (246:1). When made prior to the Torah study of Yissachar, the arrangement forms a bona fide partnership, whereby Zevulun brings in the income, and Yissachar the Torah.
It follows that the Yissachar-Zevulun arrangement cannot be a source for the “sale” of reward and punishment after the relevant acts have already been performed.
Selling Reward and Punishment Before the Deed
Although as noted, we cannot derive the concept of selling reward after the event from the Yissachar-Zevulun arrangement, it seems that the concept remains a source for selling reward before the act that earns the reward takes place.
Sefer Yissachar Zevulun (Vol. 1, p. 36) actually cites the above ruling of the Rema as proof of the point. The Rema notes that if a person has already studied his portion of Torah, “he can no longer sell the reward thereof.” This indicates that if the transaction is made before the study of Torah takes place, the sale will be valid – and that by extension this will also be true of other mitzvos, and not of Torah study alone.
Indeed, the Or HaChaim HaKadosh (Rishon LeZion no. 249) writes that this is the underlying principle of making a neder (vow) to charity on behalf of a deceased relative or other cause. Just like the Yissachar-Zevulun arrangement, a person can dedicate the reward of a mitzvah for a specific cause, and provided it is done before the event of the mitzvah, the dedication is valid.
The Shelah HaKadosh (Shevuos 33a) similarly writes that “a person can buy a portion of reward in Torah study or mitzvah deeds from his friend, or sell his the reward before the deed is done.”
An Absurdity?
The approach of these authorities, whereby selling reward of future actions is possible, is placed into question by an early responsum on the subject written by RavHaiGaon.
In his glosses to the aforementioned ruling of the Rema (concerning the Yissachar-Zevulun partnership), Rabbi AkivaEiger notes a responsum of MaharamAl-Shaker (no. 101). Maharam was asked about whether or not the sale of eternal merits (such as the merit of reading from the Torah) can be legally valid, or whether such a sale has no legal significance.
In replying, he cites from Rav Hai Gaon, who was consulted concerning somebody who wished to give the merit of his fasting to somebody else, or alternatively to sell it for financial gain. RavHai’s response was unequivocal. He declared it unthinkable that one person should suffer the punishment of another’s sin, or receive the gains for another’s good deeds, and that the very concept is an absurdity (divrei hevel).
Moreover, he writes that the person who sells his reward of his deeds is truly foolish, for what good is there in good deeds that are done for the purpose of financial gain. The deeds will rather be a cause for punishment, for they make the Divine Name into an instrument with which to make money. The buyer, too, is surely acting unwisely, for no money can buy another’s reward (the above Gemara in Sotah mentions the verse in ShirHaShirim: “If one were to give all the wealth of one’s house for love, it would be utterly scorned”).
MaharamAl-Shaker gives his full agreement to the words of RavHaiGaon, and declares a sale of reward or punishment is entirely ineffective. A person is rewarded and punished for his own deeds, and not for the deeds of others.
The question now is how the ruling of the Rema, as based on RabbeinuYerucham, can be reconciled with that of RavHai: Surely the Rema implies, as several authorities note, that reward can in fact be sold?
Two Types of Reward
The Imrei Binah (Vol. 1, Addendum no. 13) addresses this question, and makes a distinction between two different types of reward.
He explains that one type of reward is seguli. This refers to the spiritual effect of a mitzvah deed, which draws a person closer to Hashem – a closeness that is itself a person’s reward for the world to come. The Imrei Binah writes that this type of reward is non-transferrable: A person’s spiritual gains cannot be sold to somebody else. This is the reward that RavHai referred to in writing that reward cannot be sold.
However, there is another type of reward, which the Imrei Binah calls gemuli – recompense. Beyond the spiritual consequence of the mitzvah deed, a person also receives his ‘recompense’ for complying with the Torah’s instruction. The Imrei Binah writes that according to the Rema, this type of reward can be transferred, when the transfer is done in advance of the deed itself.
Shut Minchas Yitzchak (6:100) offers a different solution to the question from Rav Hai. He posits that even Rabbeinu Yerucham and the Rema concede that reward and punishment – of any kind – cannot be sold or transferred. As Rav Shlomo Kluger (Shut Tuv Taam VaDaas 1:217) notes, “the world to come is not for sale!” He explains that the ability of Zevulun to share in Yissachar’s reward does not derive from a sale per se, but rather from the fact that Yissachar enables the Torah study to take place.
Because the Torah study itself is made possible by Zevulun, Zevulun receives part of the reward (see also Shut Iggros Moshe, Yoreh De’ah 4:37) – just as we find that by facilitating their Torah study, women share a portion in their husband’s eternal reward (Berachos 17a).
According to the Minchas Yitzchak, this is therefore very different from the concept of simply selling reward and punishment. Yet, as noted above, the wording of the Rema does not indicate this explanation.
I should be His Atonement
Returning to the question of transferring punishment for sin, we seem to find a number of sources indicating that a person can be punished for another’s misdeeds.
Rivkah is recorded by the Torah (Bereishis 27:13) as telling her son Yaakov that “your curse should be upon me,” which suggests that the result of a “sin” can be deflected onto somebody else. This is also indicated by the Gemara in Sanhedrin (49b), where we find that King Shlomo was prepared to accept on himself the curses with which his father had cursed Yoav. These curses, indeed, afflicted his progeny.
Another source is the Gemara in Shabbos (89b), which states that our forefather, Yitzchak was prepared to forfeit some years of his own life in order that Hashem should not punish the nation of Israel. In Sukkah (45b) we also find the declaration of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai whereby “I can exempt the entire world from judgment.” Rashi explains that “in my merit I suffer all of their sins, and exempt them from judgment.”
Indeed, the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b) writes that a person should honor his parents by saying (within twelve months of their deaths) “I should be the atonement of their deaths.” Rashi explains: “All evil due to befall them should fall upon me.” This halachah is ruled by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 240:9). This suggests that a son can accept his parent’s punishment upon himself, and this will exempt the parent from receiving his just deserts. Moreover, we find elsewhere that this idea can apply even to strangers (see Mishnah, Negaim 2:1, and commentary of Rambam; see also Sukkah 20a).
How can these ideas be explained, in light of the basic principle that each person is rewarded for his own good deeds and punished for his own misdeeds?
Deferrals of the Proofs
The mentioned sources are raised by Rav Chaim Sofer (Shut Machaneh Chaim, Choshen Mishpat 2, 20), who assumes as simple that there cannot be a sale of merit and punishment, citing (as Rav Hai does) from the Gemara in Shabbos (55a): “There is no death without sin, and no suffering without iniquity.” He also derives the principle from Hashem’s response to Moshe Rabbeinu, namely “he who has sinned shall be erased from My book” (Shemos 32:31; see commentary of the Ramban to the Pasuk).
Based on his assumption, Rav Chaim Sofer proceeds to defer the sources noted above. He explains that the statement “I should be his atonement” is only an expression of honor, and not an actual means of atonement by transfer of punishment to the living. He adds that the statement can also be understood as a kind of prayer to Hashem to forgive and atone for iniquity (see also Shut Betzel Hachochma 6:26). He also explains that Rivkah’s statement of her receiving Yaakov’s punishment was only intended as a prophetic expression, to say that Yaakov won’t receive any punishment for the deed. King Shlomo, too, only meant that Yoav will not be punished beyond the punishment he had already received.
The Machaneh Chaim even addresses the anecdote noted at the outset in the name of the Maharasha. Of this he writes: “That which the multitudes say in the name of the Maharsha, who knows if there is any truth in tales that people spread in the world, which are surely inventions that never took place.” He notes that the seller of spiritual reward is guilty of heresy, no less, and the buyer guilty of brazenness, and instructs both to fast annually on the day the transaction was made.
Question of Legal Transfer
Another point raised by the Machaneh Chaim is that there is no legal mechanism by which such intangibles as reward and punishment can be transferred.
In this matter we find an interesting opinion expressed by Rav Shalom Shwadron (Shut Maharsham, Vol. 3, no. 151), who writes that although punishment cannot be sold, the buyer can become a “guarantor” (arev) for the punishment, and risks suffering the punishment in place of the original sinner.
By means of this idea, which he demonstrates by means of the general concept of arvus (mutual responsibility), he explains that even according to Rav Hai, it can be suggested that although a full legal transfer cannot be made, the buyer can become an arev for the punishment.
He also raises the possibility that in this matter a full legal kinyan is not required, because the matter remains in the hands of Hashem. It is up to Him to decide who will ultimately receive the punishment, so that the agreement, even without a full legal acquisition, might be sufficient.
He concludes by mentioning several episodes in which one person bought the reward or (sold the) punishment of another, and that halachic authorities certainly took the matter seriously.
We therefore have two schools of thought concerning the concept of making transactions in matter of spiritual reward and punishment.
According to one approach – taken up by Maharam Alshaker, the Machaneh Chaim, Minchas Yitzchak and other authorities, it is not possible for one person to suffer the punishment of another or enjoy his reward. The basic principle according to these opinions is that each person will reap the rewards of suffer the consequences of his own deeds.
However, according to another school of thought, this is not the case, and even matters of spiritual reward and punishment can be transferrable on some level.
Certainly – whether they work or not – the message emerging from many authorities is that one should steer clear of transactions which can bring him punishment for other people’s misdeeds.
