In contrast to this analysis, Rav Menashe Klein shlita has written that shareholding is halachically considered as true ownership, exaggerating the power of shareholders by comparing the corporation in the hands of its shareholders to clay in the hands of a sculptor (Mishnah Halachos Vol. 6, sec. 277; concerning ribis, see also Minchas Shlomo Vol 1, No 28).
Elsewhere, Rav Klein mentions the view of Rabbi Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecha Shlomo (sec. 238), who makes a distinction between shareholders that have a say in company affairs and those who have no say in decision-making. Based on this, Rav Klein (Mishneh Halachos, Vol. 5, sec. 102) writes that because [under American law] only a fifteen percent shareholding bequeaths shareholders with a right to voice opinions in decisions, it follows that smaller shareholders have no obligation to sell their holdings out of concern for chametz (see also Minchas Yitzchak, Vol. 3, sec. 1, who takes a stringent line with regard to chametz).
An interesting source on this matter is quoted by Rav Dovid Hoffmann, who deals at some length with the issue of shareholdings in companies holding chametz on Pesach. He opens his response on the subject (Melamed Le’hoil sec. 91) with a quotation from a finals examination given by his predecessor at the helm of the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary, Rabbi Azriel Hildesheimer, who set his examinees a question on this very topic: Does a shareholder in a company owning chametz have to sell his shares before Pesach?
All the examinees, Rabbi Hoffmann reports, replied in the negative, each of them suggesting various reasons for which there is no obligation of selling one’s shareholding. Rabbi Hildesheimer himself, who made annotations to several exam papers, was clearly in agreement with this assessment, also quoting a number of possibilities for which a shareholder does not transgress chametz prohibitions.
These reasons include the shareholder’s inability to translate his “ownership” into a tangible share in the chametz, the [non-Jewish] directors’ responsibility for the chametz, the fact that the principle of bereirah applies to a shareholder’s ownership, and the nullification of Jewish ownership among the majority of non-Jewish shareholders, and others.
The most weighty consideration, however, is perhaps the ruling quoted from Rav Yitzchak Isaav Ha-Levi Ittinger (Shut Maharia Vol. 2, sec. 54, 124), a prominent nineteenth century halachic authority, who maintained that shareholding does not constitute halachic ownership at all, thus relieving any concern over a prohibition. Notably, Cheishev Ha’ephod (Vol. 1, sec. 62) writes that the Rov of Tchebin also cited the ruling of Maharia, and the authority of Maharam Shik (sec. 158) also falls in favor of the lenient ruling.
[See also Bris Yehudah, Chap. 20, note 27, who writes that the general custom is not to consider minority shareholding as actual ownership; but see Minchas Shlomo, who writes that he was “astounded” to see the ruling quoted in Darkei Teshuvah.]
Returning to the question of shares in corporations that trade in foodstuffs, opinions who maintain that shareholding does not imply ownership would therefore imply—according to the opinions cited above from the Pischei Teshuvah—a lenient stance.
Although Rav Moshe Feinstein seems to have maintained that a corporation is an actual partnership of sorts (see Igros Moshe CM 2:15; OC 1:19, 4:54), he nonetheless rules that one may own shares of stock in a non-kosher food chain, provided that he does not exert any decision-making control in the company (Igros Moshe EH Vol. 1, sec. 7). In Rav Feinstein’s opinion, the prohibition of partnership in non-kosher trading depends on the partner’s ability to exercise influence on company matters.
Thus, Igros Moshe writes that even if shareholders are a given a vote on company decisions, they are not considered “partners” with respect to this halachah. Only where a substantial proportion of shares, such as over 50% of the company, is owned, thereby bequeathing the shareholder a dominant say in the company’s operational decisions, would the ownership of stock be considered a violation of the prohibition.
Thus, although we have mentioned that some authorities adopt a stricter position, prohibiting, one may rely on the ruling of Igros Moshe, which combines with the numerous opinions mentioned above who rule leniently. This is certainly true with regard to the question of trading in non-kosher foods, which is a rabbinic proscription.
In summary:
- It is forbidden to conduct regular trade in non-kosher foods. This prohibition is limited to foods that are prohibited on a Torah level.
- Even being a non-active partner in the trade of non-kosher products is prohibited.
- Concerning shareholding, it is permitted to own shares in companies that trade in non-kosher foods, provided that this shareholding does not bequeath the shareholder significant decision-making power.
- If the company trades (in significant volume) in a variety of items as well as non-kosher products, no prohibition applies in shareholding.
