We generally look at mitzvos as being a harmonious part of Jewish life. Rather than running contrary to the human condition, mitzvos are part and parcel of the human condition, and they in fact serve to raise our human interactions – with the world, with others, and with ourselves – to a higher level.
And yet, there are circumstances in which mitzvos make demands of us that are not pleasant. This often depends on personal circumstance. While there is no mitzvah that is unpleasant per se – the verse testifies that the ways of Torah are “ways of pleasantness” (Mishlei 3:7) – there are various situations in which upkeep of mitzvos can involve pain on a personal level.
In the present article we will investigate the question of mitvzah performance when it involves physical injury, sickness and pain.
Does the obligation of mitzvos apply even when their performance involves pain and discomfort? Does a person have to undergo physical damage or illness for the sake of performing a mitzvah? We know that a person does not have to give up his life for the sake of mitzvos (apart from three). Must he give up his health?
These questions are addressed below.
Long Hangovers after Four Cups
The Gemara (Nedarim 49b) tells us that Rabbi Yehudah used to suffer from grievous headaches after drinking the Four Cups of wine on Pesach. His head would hurt from Pesach through Shavuos. Based on this anecdote, the Rashba (1:238) rules that even somebody who hates wine, or for whom wine is physically damaging, must nonetheless drink the Four Cups.
The Rashba also cites the Yerushalmi (Pesachim 10:1) that Rabbi Yonah, like Rabbi Yehudah, would suffer from severe headaches during the Omer period on account of the Four Cups.
The Rashba’s opinion forms the basis for the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 472:10): “Somebody who desists from wine because it damages him or because he detests it, must nonetheless force himself to drink, in order to perform the mitzvah of the Four Cups.”
The Shulchan Aruch does not expound on the halachah, and doesn’t discuss the degree of physical damage a person must be ready to incur for the sake of the mitzvah. The Mishnah Berurah (35) does address this question, and writes that a person must drink even though the wine distresses him and causes him pain, but the obligation does not include actually becoming ill. The Shaar Ha-Zion (52) adds: “For this is not the way of freedom.”
This comment implies that for most mitzvos, since they are unrelated to the “way of freedom,” the obligation to perform the mitzvah applies even if as a result the person will fall ill. The Four Cups, it appears, is an exception to the general rule.
Getting Sick on Maror
Shut Besamim Rosh (no. 94) (a work that is cited in halachic discourse even though it was composed by a maskil who falsely attributed it to the Rosh) discusses the question of eating Maror under circumstances where doing so will cause the person to fall ill. According to the Besamim Rosh, there is no obligation to eat Maror under these circumstances, for the following two reasons:
1. The exemption mentioned by the Gemara concerning the mitzvah of Sukkah, from which “the sick and their care-givers” are exempt, applies not only to Sukkah but to all mitzvos: If a person will become sick through performing a mitzvah, he is not obligated to do it. The Torah, he explains, is given to us for life, and not for becoming sick.
2. There is a personal obligation to look after one’s health, and every action we take to guard our health is considered a mitzvah. Therefore, because “somebody who is busy with a mitzvah is exempt from a [different] mitzvah,” it follows that we are always exempt from those mitzvahs that threaten to damage our health.
Shut Binyan Shlomo (47) defers both of the rationales offered by the Besamim Rosh, stating that the exemption mentioned in Sukkah is in fact specific to the mitzvah of Sukkah (as noted by Tosafos). He further explains that the exemption from mitzvos for somebody who is performing a mitzvah applies specifically to somebody who is actively involved in a mitzvah and therefore cannot perform the other mitzvah.
A sick person himself is surely not actively involved in a mitzvah, and (by contrast with his care-givers) he is certainly obligated in those mitzvos that he is able to perform.
Yet, the Binyan Shlomo proceeds to agree that there is no requirement to perform a mitzvah in case the person will become ill, because sickness is worth more to people than money.
We know that the obligation to perform Torah mitzvos does not require an expenditure of more than a fifth of a person’s money (Orach Chaim 656:1). If there is no obligation to spend more than one fifth of one’s wealth for the sake of performing a mitzvah, then one need not perform a mitzvah if he will suffer physical damage since physical health is worth more than money.
The Binyan Shlomo thus extends the exemption, based on financial considerations, to a general exemption from mitzvos that are liable to cause a person illness.
The Opinion of the Mishnah Berurah
The Mishnah Berurah (473:43) also rules that a sick person who is unable to eat Maror due to health considerations is exempt from the mitzvah, and should eat only a little to “recall” the mitzvah. (He should not recite a berachah over this Maror.)
Indeed, even where the Maror will not cause actual physical damage, but only cause a person to suffer, the Mishnah Berurah (Shaar Ha-Zion 61) implies that there is no full obligation to perform the mitzvah, and only that “it is proper for a person to strain himself with all his strength to perform the mitzvah of the Sages.”
This ruling appears to contradict the above ruling concerning the Four Cups, where it was implied that for all other mitzvos the obligation applies even when performing the mitzvah threatens to cause a person to be sick, since the reason a person need not drink four cups when he will take ill because it is not “the way of freedom.”
It is possible, however, that the mitzvah of the Four Cups is different from other mitzvos, because there is an obligation to perform the mitzvah even if this requires a person to collect alms from door to door (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 472:13). This special obligation connected with the Four Cups sets it aside from other mitzvos, from which a person without means is exempt, and for which a risk of illness is likewise sufficient to exempt a person from the mitzvah. That is why the Mishnah Berurah finds it necessary to invoke the reason that it is not “the way of freedom” in order to free a person who is liable to take ill from the mitzah to drink four cups.
By contrast with these opinions, the opinion of Shut Maharam Schick (no. 260) is that a person is only exempt from eating Maror if doing so involves danger of death; danger of sickness is not sufficient to exempt a person from the mitzvah.
Torah and Rabbinic Mitzvos
With regard to Rabbinic mitzvos, we find in the Gemara (Kesubos 60a) that somebody who is in great pain may suckle directly from a goat on Shabbos (the milk is a kind of medicine for the ailment), in spite of the prohibition of mefarek (a toldoh of dosh-threshing) that this involves.
The Gemara explains that feeding directly from a goat is not the ordinary way of milking it, and therefore the prohibition is only rabbinic in nature – and the Sages didn’t impose a prohibition where there is pain.
Since we find that the Sages did not enact rabbinic prohibitions under circumstances of suffering/illness, it should follow that a person is exempt from rabbinic mitzvos in similar circumstances. Why then do we find a discussion, as presented above, of performing rabbinic mitzvos where the threat of illness is present?
The answer to this can be found in the Beis Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 123), who writes that regular rabbinic prohibitions are not waived in the face of pain and illness, such as the prohibition of setam yeinam (non-Jewish wine) which is forbidden even to the sick. It therefore appears that we cannot learn a general principle of exempting somebody in danger of illness or pain from the case of feeding from a goat, because that exemption is specific to the case.
Shut Chavas Yair (no. 164) further asserts that the exemption cannot be applied generally since it applies only to severe suffering, and not to regular pain or sickness.
Based on this approach, it is clear that we require special reasons for exempting somebody from performing mitzvos under circumstances of potential suffering or illness, as noted above.[1]
Danger to a Limb and Illness in the Face of Torah Mitzvos
The Gemara (Yevamos 72a) writes that according to Rabbi Yehudah, a mashuch (whose foreskin has been pulled over his Bris) is exempt from Bris Milah, because of the concern that he will be injured and become a crus shafcha (who is unable to have children) – though this does not involve any danger of death.
This indicates that danger to a limb is sufficient to exempt a person from performance of a Torah mitzvah (unless the danger of becoming a crus shafcha is more severe than danger to a regular limb).
This point supports to some degree the position of Shut Binyan Shlomo (as mentioned above) that a person is not obligated to place himself into danger of illness even for a Torah mitzvah. This is also the opinion of the Birchei Yosef (640:5).
However, there is room to make a distinction between danger of regular illness and the danger of losing a limb. This difference is raised by the Shach (Yoreh De’ah 157:3), who raises a possibility that even for a negative Torah mitzvah, danger of losing a limb is sufficient to waive the prohibition – and leans in practice towards leniency. This leniency does not apply to danger of illness.
It is also possible that the case of Bris Milah is different because one who renders someone a crus shofcho violates a Torah prohibition. Therefore, the reason not to perform a bris on him is not due to physical danger but to the threat of a Torah violation.
Crippled for Life or Bris Milah?
Shut Avnei Nezer (Yoreh De’ah 321) was consulted concerning a child who was born with a crooked leg. The expert physicians advised that the leg be straightened out immediately, while the bones were still soft and flexible, and that the procedure be performed before the eighth day of his life. It was clear that, should the procedure be performed, the infant would not be able to undergo Bris Milah on the eighth day.
Addressing the question of whether the procedure is permitted or not, the Avnei Nezer explained that it is permitted to perform it, relying on the fact – as noted above – that one need not spend more than a fifth of one’s wealth to perform Torah mitzvos. If there is no obligation to spend more than one fifth of one’s money on a mitzvah, it follows that there is no obligation for a person to render himself a cripple for the sake of performing a mitzvah, for physical wholeness is worth more than a fifth of one’s assets.
But like the cases above, the case of the Avnei Nezer addresses a risk of permanent physical damage, which is worse than illness that doesn’t involve permanent damage.
Therefore, although it appears clear that one does not have to endanger a limb in order to perform a mitzvah, the question of endangering one’s health for the sake of a mitzvah remains a matter of dispute among authorities.
As a type of compromise, the Eshel Avraham (Orach Chaim 656:1) suggests that a person consider whether he would be prepared to part with a fifth of his wealth in order to avoid the illness or suffering that is threatened with. If he is prepared to pay one fifth of his wealth to avoid it, he is exempt from the mitzvah. But if he is not prepared to lay out so much, he will be obligated in the mitzvah.
