The Gemara (Yevamos 62b) teaches that Rabbi Akiva’s 24,000 disciples died during the Omer period – between Pesach and Shavuos – because they did not show proper respect to one another. The fact that they died for the reason given during the build-up to receiving the Torah, is instructive.
The loss of 24,000 disciples went far beyond the human aspect. There was also a loss of Torah – the lofty Torah that Rabbi Akiva transmitted to his army of disciples. On account of their failure to show proper respect to one another, the expression of this Torah that would have emerged from them was lost.
Rabbi Akiva’s disciples were considered unworthy to transmit the oral law, and an alternative path for Rabbi Akiva’s Torah – the five disciples who later bore Rabbi Akiva’s Torah banner – had to be blazed.
The great lesson for us is that receiving Torah is contingent on treating our fellows with due respect. If we fail to appreciate each individual’s part in Torah, and thus fail to give him the respect he deserves, then we lose our own right to Torah.
In the light of this, we dedicate the present article to treating others with proper respect. In particular, we will discuss the practical applications of the prohibition against onaas devarim, causing emotional hurt, which is written in Parashas Behar.
When does this prohibition apply? Does the prohibition depend on a person’s intentions? Is it forbidden to call a person by a nickname? What happens if a person is retaliating to somebody else’s hurtful words? How do these principles play out in the context of the study hall?
These questions, among others, are discussed below.
The Torah Prohibition
The Torah teaches: “When you sell something to your fellow, or buy from your fellow, do not wrong your fellow man” (Vayikra 25:14). In a subsequent verse, the Torah states: “You shall not wrong one another.”
The Gemara cites Tanaim who state that the latter verse refers to onaas devarim. This means that causing somebody else emotional pain, by means of verbal, written, or any other form of communication, is a Torah prohibition. This basic prohibition is recorded by the Rambam and by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:1).
The Gemara moreover writes that the prohibition of onaas devarim is more stringent even than the Torah transgression of monetary onaah (overcharging) because it attacks the person himself rather than his money. Furthermore, an added degree of severity is implied because the pasuk mentions the fear of G-d specifically in the instruction of onaas devarim. A third aspect in which onaas devarim is more stringent is that monetary wrongs can be corrected by paying back the damage, whereas anguish and grief cannot be directly compensated.
The Gemara adds that the punishment for causing suffering is executed more swiftly than that of monetary wrongs. Hashem, the Gemara explains, hears the call of one who calls to Him out of pain and anguish.
Shopping Anguish
The primary source for the prohibition of onaas devarim is the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 58), which notes a number of cases in which the prohibition is transgressed.
The Mishnah teaches that one may not ask a shopkeeper, “How much is this item?” when in fact he has no intent to buy it. Similarly, one may not pore over a particular item, giving an impression of interest in purchasing it, if the person lacks the money to buy it. This halachah is ruled by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:4).
Commentaries suggest several reasons for this prohibition. The Meiri explains that when other people are present in the shop, they may receive an impression that the item is not worth its price, and the shopkeeper will lose business. According to this, the issue is not emotional harm, but rather causing financial damage (see also Rashbam, Pesachim 112b).
However, this interpretation is difficult in view of the context of the teaching – in a Mishnah dealing with onaas devarim (emotional, rather than financial harm). Presumably for this reason the Meiri adds that even when there are no other customers in the store the prohibition remains, since the action causes the storekeeper grief.
The straightforward understanding of this grief is that the vendor, who justifiably sees a potential sale, is disappointed. The Rach (Pesachim 112b) gives an additional explainion-that the item is devalued in the eyes of the vendor, causing him grief.
The example given by the Mishnah commonly occurs after someone has already completed a purchase, but wishes to compare prices elsewhere to check if he made a good deal or not. If he has no intent to buy another item, he may not inquire in a store about prices, unless he makes it clear that he has no desire to buy the product but only to procure information.
Past Deeds
A further example given by the Mishnah is that of a Baal Teshuvah, to whom one may not say, “Remember your deeds of old.”
The prohibition applies to all similar cases in which a person will be pained to remember something. For instance, the Gemara (59b) teaches that if one of the family members was hung as punishment for some crime, the word “hang” should not be used with all family members, even something like, “hanging up a fish.”
Similarly, one may not dishonor a non-Jew in the presence of a convert, even after ten generations [since the conversion] have passed (Sanhedrin 94b).
The issue of past misdeeds is especially relevant when one wishes to rebuke or discipline somebody else, such as a mashgiach in a yeshiva. The Gemara states that if someone experiences suffering and hardship, it is wrong to emulate the ways of Iyov’s friends, who told him that punishment is always meted out for some sin. Thus, a mashgiach must be wary of causing a student unnecessary distress.
Does Intent Matter?
The question of the mashgiach rebuking a student leads us to an important distinction: the intent of the speaker. The basic prohibition of onaas devarim applies specifically to cases in which the speaker intends to aggrieve another, and not when he inadvertently causes grief.
Since carelessness in aggrieving others is a sign of inner apathy towards others’ feelings, it is a sure transgression of onaas devarim. The Chinuch (238) thus warns us to take care lest the nuances of our speech cause another grief.
Moreover, we find several instances in which people were punished for causing others grief, despite the purity of their intentions. A classic example of this is the story of Chanah and Peninah. Although Chazal teach that Peninah had good intentions in humiliating Chanah, these did not save her from the tragic consequence of her children’s deaths. Similar is the sad story of Rav Rechumi (Kesubos 62b) who fell to his death after inadvertently causing his wife to cry over his absence. A further instance is the case of Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol, whose distress, after being placed in excommunication, had global repercussions (Bava Metiza 59b)
Thus, even well-meaning onaas devarim must be avoided, wherever possible. Only when it is a matter of a mitzvah should the step of aggrieving our fellow – without malicious intent of course – be taken.
Chastising Disciples
On the subject of disciples, we find that Rabbi Yehudah HaNassi (Kesuvos 103b) stated that a teacher must deal strongly with his disciples.
The Rambam thus rules, “If it appears to the teacher that they are not applying themselves to the words of Torah and are lax about them, and, therefore, do not understand, he is obligated to display anger towards them and to shame them with his words, to sharpen their powers of concentration. In this context, our Sages said: Cast fear into the students.”
Shut Chavas Yair (152) adds another source for permission to shame and insult disciples where this is required for their training, citing the words of Rebbi (Yevamos 9a) who lashed out at his disciple (Levi): “It appears that he had no brain in his skull.” The Chavas Yair points out that Rebbi was clearly not worried, in this case, about the rabbinic warning to care for the honor of one’s disciples.
However, this is the exception to the rule. In general, as we learn from the tragic history of the disciples of Rabbi Akiva, that it is essential to maintain utmost respect for disciples, the more so in the Torah study hall.
When Good Questions are Bad Questions
An example of causing shame in the context of Torah study is asking questions of somebody who will clearly be unable to provide the answer. The Shulchan Aruch (228:4) mentions this, pointing out the care that must be taken to avoid causing distress or shame.
The Sefer Chassidim (312) instructs a host to avoid questioning his guest in matters of Divrei Torah, unless he is sure that the guest is capable of answering.
Even when a Rav is giving a Shiur, talmidim may ask questions only after the Rav has collected his thoughts, and should restrict their questions to what is currently being studied, for fear of embarrassing or distressing the Rav. Naturally, this halachah is somewhat flexible, depending on the circumstances and on the nature of the Rav in question.
At the same time, a Rav may use questioning in order to gauge his students’ knowledge, and to sharpen their minds (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 246:12).
Just Retaliation?
A fascinating question arises in cases of retaliation. If someone is under physical assault, he may defend himself in kind, in spite of the general prohibition against hitting one’s fellow. Even where there is no danger to life, one is not obligated to allow an assailant to continue his assault, and may strike to fend him off (Choshen Mishpat 422:13)
Does the same principle apply to verbal abuse? Based on the parallel concept of physical assault, it will certainly be permitted to hurl an epithet aimed at stopping an assaulting party from his verbal deluge. Under most circumstances, however, returning an insult just makes matters worse. Is it then permitted to retaliate in kind, even though it may cause pain or offense, or is the principle of physical retaliation related to self-defense (see Rosh, Bava Kama 3:13), and therefore generally inapplicable to cases of verbal assault?
We may find an answer to this question in the very halachah that discusses physical retaliation, where the Rema appears to equate verbal and physical abuse: “So too, in cases of insults and embarrassments, he who started must pay the fine.” Just as the person who initiated a physical fight is held responsible for the affair and therefore liable to pay damages, so too in cases of verbal damages, the initiator is liable to pay the fine. (There is no monetary penalty for simply causing grief or distress (agmas nefesh). There is, however, a fine for causing public shame and embarrassment).
The fact that the initiator alone is held responsible, whereas the person who responded is exempt from liability, seems to indicate that a person who responds in kind to verbal assault has committed no wrong.
Yet, the Raanach (no. 50) explains that retaliation does not incur a penalty only when it is in the heat of the moment. In cases of verbal damages, such as embarrassment and shame, one is only liable to pay damages for words with spoken with full intent and awareness (Choshen Mishpat 421:1), and not when the insult emerged in the heat of the moment. A similar line of reasoning is found in the Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Metzia 8:42).
Thus, although there is no liability for spontaneous verbal retaliation, the question remains whether it is permitted to return with a calm insult to an offender. Based on the ruling of the Raanach, it follows that somebody who lets out a wounding insult in a calm and composed state of mind is liable for damages – even if the insult is in reaction to somebody else who started the fight. It follows that this type of insult is not permitted.
Names Will Never Hurt Me?
Another branch of onaas devarim is known as mechaneh shem le-chaveiro – calling another by any expression that is not his name.
The Gemara (Bava Metzia 58b) mentions three individuals who are doomed to descend eternally to Gehinom – unlike other sinners, who are ultimately destined to rise up. Two of the three categories are related to onaas devarim. One of them – somebody who embarrasses another in public – can be easily understood. The Gemara teaches that publicly shaming somebody is akin to killing him, and the severity of the deed is well-understood. The other, however – someone who “calls his fellow by a bad name” – is harder to understand.
The Gemara explains that calling somebody a name is distinct from shaming him, because it applies even if the person has become accustomed to the name. Although no actual shame is caused, the prohibition against calling him by the name remains – and the offender is punished by eternal descent to Gehinom, Heaven forbid. Why, however, does calling a person by a name, especially one that he is accustomed to, carry such a severe punishment?
Rashi understands the severity of the transgression as relating to negative intentions: Although the victim was not shamed, the intention was nonetheless to embarrass him. Yet, the severity of the matter still appears difficult. Perhaps for this reason, Rabbeinu Yonah (Shaarei Teshuvah 3:140) writes that calling someone by a bad name is a particular case of shaming. It is possible that calling by a bad name is particularly severe, and therefore warrants special mention.
Based on the Gemara in Megillah (27b), there is a virtue of calling a person by his true given name, rather than using a nickname, even if the nickname is not in any way offensive (see also Yefei Lev, Vol. 5, Yoreh De’ah 242). Certainly, one must be careful to avoid using a nickname that has a negative connotation.
By showing proper respect for one another, and refraining from causing harm and hurt, may we merit a true receiving of the Torah on Shavuos, both collectively and individually.
