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Spreading Tales: Grave Prohibition or Great Mitzvah?

The Torah instruction to recall the deed of Miriam (Devarim 24:9), who was punished by tsora’as after speaking lashon hara about her brother Moshe, is interpreted as a call to remember the prohibition of lashon hara. As Rashi writes, “If you wish to avoid the plague of tsora’as, do not speak lashon hara.”

The Sages relate this to the sin of the Spies, which appears in Parashas Shelach. Citing the Midrash, Rashi (Bamidbar 13:1) explains that the story of the Spies is juxtaposed with the tale of Miriam to teach: They saw the punishment of Miriam, but failed to learn the required lesson and fell into the trap of evil slander.

In the present article we will discuss the prohibition of lashon hara, and dwell on the dilemma often faced by a conscientious person, who must decide whether to speak up or to remain silent. On the one hand, speaking lashon hara is one of the gravest Torah sins. On the other, it is sometimes a mitzvah to speak up, even when one paints a person or people in a negative light.

What is the nature of the lashon hara prohibition? In which circumstances is it permitted to speak lashon hara? Does the prohibition apply equally to speaking and to hearing? Is the prohibition related to the damage that a person causes by speaking? We will discuss these questions, among others, in the present article.

The Basic Prohibition

The basic source of the prohibition of lashon hara is the instruction of the pasuk: “You shall not gossip among your people.” Literally, the words of the verse are, “You shall not walk (telech) as a gossipmonger among your people.” The words refer to somebody who goes from one place to another, picking up negative tidbits and spreading them wherever he can.

The Rambam (De’os 7:1) explains that two distinct prohibitions are included. One is the prohibition of rechilus, which involves going and informing Shimon of negative insights (or actions) that Reuven offered concerning him. By so doing, the informant sows seeds of hatred between the two, and, in the words of the Rambam, he “destroys the world.”

The second prohibition included in the words of the pasuk is the issur commonly known as lashon hara, which refers to speaking negatively about a fellow Jew. The Rambam explains that this prohibition is even more heinous than the first, and emphasizes that the prohibition applies even when the information provided is true.

This distinguishes the halachic concept of lashon hara from the general legal concept of libel. Truth is an acceptable defense in a libel suit. It not material to the prohibition of lashon hara. Although many legal systems consider it an offense to invade a person’s privacy, the prohibition against lashon hara goes much further, prohibiting negative speech even when it is true and even where no invasion of privacy is involved.

If a person speaks falsehood about his fellow Jew, he transgresses the still more heinous offense of motzi shem ra. Not only does he spread negative information about others; he even fabricates it!

The Severity of the Prohibition

Although it involves nothing beyond speech, the severity of lashon hara cannot be overstated.

The Rambam cites Chazal (De’os 7:3):

“The Sages state that there are three sins for which a person is punished in this world, and even loses his portion in the world to come: idolatry, incest, and murder – and lashon hara weighs up against all of them together… The Sages also state: Lashon hara kills three people: he who speaks it, he who accepts it, and he who is spoken about.”

The effect of lashon hara is not only to bring hate and discord within the community, but even to distance us from Hashem. The Midrash (Devarim Rabba 6:14) writes that lashon hara was even the cause of the destruction of the Temple: “On account of the lashon hara among them, I have removed My Shechinah from among them.” This is reflected in the Talmudic teaching whereby the Second Temple was destroyed on account of baseless hatred, as embodied by the tragic tale of Kamtza and bar Kamtza (Gittin 55b).

In accordance with its great severity, we find that the Vilna Gaon warns his family of this “most heinous of all sins,” writing that: “Each and every moment that a person guards his tongue grants him a portion of the hidden light, which no angel or creature can fathom… for the mouth is the holy of holies.”

The Prohibition of Accepting Lashon Hara

Not only is it forbidden to speak lashon hara; it is even forbidden to accept it as true.

The Reishis Chochmah (Shaar Ha-Kedushah 13) writes that somebody who accepts lashon hara is considered as though he has actually spoken it. It is the responsibility of somebody who hears lashon hara to silence the speaking party, and not to accept his words.

The Reishis Chochmah bases this ruling on an interpretation of the pasuk, “Do not spread false reports.” “That we should not believe lashon hara in our hearts, to think in our minds that the words are words of truth, and to deride the person about whom they were spoken, Heaven forbid.”

The Chafetz Chaim (Chap. 6) expounds on this matter, explaining that one must be wary even of hearing lashon hara – even if one does not believe the gossip. If a person is unable cause the speech to stop, and cannot leave the room or seal his ears, he should be very careful not to believe that which he hears and to derive no pleasure from what he hears.

The Damage of Lashon Hara

Another aspect of lashon hara is the damage it can cause. Aside from the intrinsic importance of guarding one’s tongue, one cannot know what damage gossip-mongering can cause.

A well-known tale illustrates the extent of the damage that lashon hara can bring. It was the way of a certain man to go about gossiping and telling malicious stories without restraint. After several years, the man realized how much his tales had hurt people and how much damage he had caused to people’s relationships, and began to feel remorse for what he had done.

The man went to his Rabbi, seeking repentance, and agreeing to do anything that the Rabbi would tell him to make amends and achieve atonement. The Rabbi told the man: “Take a feather pillow, cut it open, and scatter the feathers into the wind.”

The man thought this was a bizarre request, but it was simple enough, and so he did it. When he returned to inform the rabbi that the task was done, the Rabbi said: “Now, go and collect all the feathers, and return them to the pillow.”

Again, the man went to do as the Rabbi had instructed, but found that the feathers had blown far and wide, and he was unable to retrieve more than a handful. He returned to the rabbi, ashamed to admit he was not able to gather the feathers, and even more ashamed in his realization of the lesson the Rabbi had taught him.

“Your words,” concluded the Rabbi, “are like the feathers: Once they leave your mouth, you know not where they will go, and you can never retrieve them.”

How true are the words of the pasuk: “He who guards his mouth and his tongue, keeps himself from calamity” (Mishlei 21:23).

Lashon Hara for a Constructive Purpose

Notwithstanding the great severity of the prohibition, it is permitted to speak lashon hara when a positive purpose requires it.

An example of this is found in the Chafetz Chaim (3:3):

“Nonetheless, if a person sees a negative disposition in somebody else, such as haughtiness or anger or other bad character traits, or that he is idle in Torah study and so, it is correct to tell this to his children or to his disciples, and to warn them that they should not draw close to him, so that they should not learn from his ways.”

Where speaking what would otherwise be lashon hara has a positive purpose which cannot be achieved other than speaking the words in question, there is no prohibition in doing so. On the contrary, it is sometimes an obligation to speak up in order to prevent damage and to bring about benefit (see Be’er Mayim Chaim Chap. 9).

This concept is found in the writings of Rabbeinu Yonah (Shaarei Teshuvah 3:218), who writes that it is a mitzvah to deride a person who is a habitual sinner and banishes the fear of G-d from before him, so that others should distance themselves from his ways.

In fact, the permission to speak lashon hara for a positive purpose emerges from the above-noted deed of Miriam, which we are instructed to recall. The Ramban explains that although by recalling the deed of Miriam we recall her sin, and speak (to a degree) of her disgrace, this does not involve a prohibition of lashon hara because of the purpose: The Torah commands us to reveal the matter, so that the severity of lashon hara should always be on our minds.

In the context of speaking up where necessary, it is worth repeating the warning issued by the Pischei Teshuvah (Orach Chaim 156): “The Magen Avraham and the mussar books write at length concerning the prohibition of lashon hara. I have found it appropriate to write about the other side [of the coin]. There is a sin even greater than [speaking lashon hara], and one which is more widespread, namely, the sin of refraining from informing another about a situation in which one can save him from being victimized—all out of concern for lashon hara… One who behaves in this manner, his sin is too great to bear, and he violates the injunction, `You shall not stand by the blood of your brother.’ ”

Among the examples given by the Pischei Teshuvah is the case of a shidduch, where somebody knows that one of the parties is, “an evil person, and it is bad to marry him.” In such circumstances a person sins by withholding the information, and one is obligated to overcome a generally positive tendency towards silence by speaking out.

Conditions for Speaking

The Chafetz Chaim (Chap. 10) specifies five concurrent conditions that must be met before providing information for shidduch purposes. These are the five conditions:

  1. 1.      Consideration: The response must be carefully thought through. Is the information totally accurate? If it is the result of personal interpretation, is this the only possible interpretation of the subject’s actions? Our impressions are often influenced by many factors, including secondhand information that might not be reliable. Therefore, before giving an answer, one must carefully consider its accuracy and veracity.
  2. 2.      Exaggeration: The report must not be exaggerated or embellished. It is all too easy, in transmitting a negative report, to add a couple of details, or even an intonation of the voice, for extra effect. Doing so is forbidden. One must be careful to communicate nothing but the truth.
  3. 3.      Intention: Information must be transmitted with the express purpose of aiding and mending a situation. In the case of shidduchim, for instance, if a person hates the suggested individual, he must strive to banish the hate from his heart, and to transmit the details strictly for the constructive purpose of the shidduch. The Chafetz Chaim writes that in such a situation it is incumbent on a person to at least temporarily eradicate negative feelings from his heart, so that he can transmit the information with the right intention.
  4. 4.      Minimizing: Only those details that are essential for achieving the desired cause should be transmitted. For example, if the mention of certain details will cause the shidduch to be called off, there is no need—and no permission—to mention additional details that are not required to stop the shidduch. It is only permitted to report those negative details that are required for the purpose at hand.
  5. Undue Harm: The Chafetz Chaim adds that one must be wary that the negative information should not cause undue harm. For instance, if one is aware that the person to whom the information is confided is indiscrete and will spread the details to others in addition to the parties involved in the relevant matter, one may not tell him. It is a good habit to tell anyone to whom you are relating information, to be extra cautious not to spread the information further.

In cases where it is important to transmit negative information (for instance, for a shidduch), yet it is forbidden to do so (for instance, if it will be spread further), a person must find another means to transmit the negative impression. It is imperative to ensure that the halachic stringency will not result in a bad deal or bad shidduch, with potentially tragic ramifications.

Lashon Hara: Act or Disposition?

The permission to speak lashon hara where required for a constructive purpose raises an obvious question: We find no such halachic construction for other prohibitions. With regard to all other Torah laws, the general principles of deferral must be applied when one Torah mitzvah conflicts with another. However concerning the heinous matter of lashon hara, the prohibition is deferred by the intent—provided that the conditions noted above are met.

The Chafetz Chaim explains why this is so:

“For the foundation of the Torah’s injunction against lashon hara, even in telling the truth, is when a person’s intent is to denigrate his fellow and to rejoice in his shame. However, if the intention is to guard his fellow, so that he should not learn from his ways, it is simple that it is permitted, and this is even a mitzvah.”

A similar principle is stated by the Me’iri (Bava Basra 39a) concerning derogatory speech that is required for saving a person from financial loss: Because the intention is not to speak lashon hara (in its evil sense), no prohibition applies.

The nature of lashon hara is a practical mitzvah that reflects a negative disposition or character trait. Although the prohibition involves a positive action, the impulse that causes it is a negative trait, and the rectification of the sin is the improvement of the character that creates it. As with the sin of revenge, the Rambam therefore includes his laws of lashon hara in hilchos de’os, laws that apply to a person’s character traits and dispositions.

An explicit source for this assertion is found in the writings of the Vilna Gaon (on Esther 10:3), who explains that character traits are not generally elaborated on by the Torah, because they include the entire Torah. As examples of this, he cites one Talmudic teaching about anger (“somebody who is anger is considered as though he worships idols”), and one concerning lashon hara: “Somebody who speaks lashon hara is considered as though he blasphemes.”

Although as noted at the outset, the Torah does instruct, “You shall not gossip among your people,” it remains hard to derive both the prohibition of rechilus and of lashon hara from the single pasuk. The explanation for the lack of a more explicit prohibition, according to the Vilna Gaon, is that lashon hara involves an internal character trait, which “includes the entire Torah.”

We can therefore understand that where there is no evil intention on the part of the person speaking, and his intention is only for a good and constructive purpose, the prohibition does not apply. And yet, even where a person has no negative intention, he must abide by the rules, and be wary lest he denigrate his fellow without cause, or cause him damage by means of his speech.

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