Question
I gave someone a ride recently. As my passenger opened the door, he accidentally hit the back wheel of a bicycle whose driver was driving between where I stopped and the curb. The impact caused the bicycle and its driver to fall to the ground. The bicycle rider, who was scary-looking, became furious and started yelling and running at my passenger. The passenger quickly ran back into the car and asked me to lock the doors, which I immediately did. In his rage the bicycle rider pounded and kicked on the car and damaged the frame of my car. My grateful passenger offered to pay for the repair but I wanted to know if he is obligated to pay or just giving me a present?
Answer
In order to rule that a person is liable we have to first find a possible basis for the liability and then determine that the case under consideration satisfies the necessary criteria to make one actually liable.
In this case, one possible reason to rule that your friend is liable is because he benefited and you lost. Often one has to pay for a benefit that he received. In this case he benefited from your locked car which served as a refuge for him from his potential assailant, and you lost as a result of your car's having served as his refuge.
However, one has to be very careful when applying this basis of liability, since there are cases when one is not liable even if he benefited directly from another person's loss. A classic case where the beneficiary is not liable is where a person voluntarily paid another person's debt. This case is the subject of a dispute in the Mishna (Kesubos 107B). The consensus opinion (Shach 128, 5 finds more than 30 poskim who rule this way) is that the borrower does not owe any money to the one who pays his debt.
The difference between this benefit and where one has to pay for his benefit if it came at another's expense is that one has to pay where the benefit is positive and tangible, such as if a person plants a tree in someone's property. In your situation, as well as the case where a person paid another person's debt, the benefit is that the beneficiary was saved from something, whether paying money or an injury, which is not a positive benefit.
The Gemara (BK 58A) discusses another situation where the beneficiary avoided a loss: an animal was walking in the public thoroughfare and then slipped and fell into a field and landed on bushes in the field, thereby cushioning its fall and saving it from injury. The Gemara rules that if the bushes were damaged while cushioning the animal's fall, the animal's owner must pay the owner of the bushes for the benefit that he derived from the bushes. The Gemara itself asks why in this case the one who benefited is liable and where someone paid his debt he is not liable.
The Gemara answers that the key distinction is whether the benefactor acted voluntarily or not. In the case where he paid someone's debt, he paid the debt voluntarily and therefore, he is not entitled to any reimbursement. However, where the animal fell, the owner of the field did not act voluntarily to save the animal.
Thus, we have one sufficient condition to require the beneficiary to pay his benefactor for his benefit, namely, if the benefactor did not act voluntarily to benefit his beneficiary.
Tosafos questions the Gemara's ruling that if the benefactor acted voluntarily, he is not entitled to any reimbursement, since we find a number of cases in the Gemara where one who voluntarily benefited someone else is entitled to reimbursement. For example, Tosafos cites the case in the Gemara (BM 93B) of an unpaid shepherd who hired someone to ward off a wolf from attacking the sheep he was watching. Even though the shepherd was not required to do so, he is entitled to reimbursement from the sheep's owner.
In order to reconcile these Gemaras, Tosafos postulates that one who voluntarily benefits another is entitled to reimbursement only if it was reasonably certain that the beneficiary would have otherwise suffered a monetary loss. Whenever it is reasonably certain that he would have suffered a monetary loss, the beneficiary is liable for the benefit that he got from the benefactor's voluntary expenditure. Thus, we have a second sufficient condition for requiring a beneficiary to pay for the benefit which he received.
Thus, if either of these two conditions are fulfilled, your passenger is liable. We have to consider whether either one was fulfilled in your situation.
Your passenger took refuge in your car without any action on your part. However, in order to be fully protected he needed you to lock the doors. Thus, we have to consider whether your co-operation by locking the doors transforms your protection of your passenger into a voluntary action for which you are not entitled to reimbursement. In order to decide this issue, it is necessary to understand why the determining factor in whether the beneficiary is liable, is whether he acted voluntarily or not.
One approach is suggested by Rav Aharon Kotler (Shecheinim 3, 3). He bases his explanation on a postulate that Tosafos (BM 101A) derived from a ruling of the Gemara: if an ownerless monkey takes A's dye and uses it to dye B's wool, B is not obligated to pay A for his dye. Tosafos asks why B does not have to pay A since he benefited from A's loss.
To answer this question, Tosafos postulates that in order to determine if a person must pay for his benefit, we have to consider how the benefit came to him. If he (or an animal of his) took the benefit, he is liable. But if it came from an outside source the beneficiary is not liable. Since the monkey was ownerless, B, the owner of the wool, is not obligated to pay for the fact that his wool has been improved since he did not take anything from his benefactor. However, where the animal fell, since his animal used the bushes to cushion its fall, it is considered as if its owner had taken the benefit.
In your case your passenger took the benefit since he ran into your car. By doing so he not only took refuge, but he also he forced you to lock the doors because the Torah obligates one to protect someone from physical damage, as it says lo sa'amod al dam rei'echo-one is not allowed to stand idly by when another Jew is in danger. This is similar to the explanation of the Nesivos (128, 3) that when one is obligated by Torah law to do something it is not considered a voluntary action.
Since you did not volunteer to save your passenger, like one does when he pays someone else's debt, it is considered as if your passenger took the benefit, so he is obligated to pay.
Rav Shimon Shkop (BK 19, 6) suggests a second approach to explain the Gemara. According to his explanation, the reason one who pays another person's debt is not entitled to reimbursement is because his voluntary payment shows that he is not concerned about the loss of his money. Therefore, it is as if the benefactor did not suffer a loss in order to benefit the beneficiary and it is ze nehene veze lo choseir. Since in your case, you did nothing that would indicate that you were not concerned about the loss of money your passenger is obligated to pay you.
Additionally, it seems that in this situation the benefit that your passenger had from his use of your car satisfies the criterion of Tosafos as well. The criterion of Tosafos was that even when the benefactor voluntarily acted to benefit his beneficiary, the beneficiary is obligated to pay if the loss was virtually certain. When the bike rider chased after your passenger it seems that damage to your passenger was virtually certain since the bike rider was full of anger and determined to avenge his fall.
One point that needs further clarification is that the damage that was incurred by the car did not come from blows that would have otherwise damaged your passenger, which is different from the animal that fell onto the bushes where the damage that was incurred by the bushes happened in the course of the animal's salvation. However, probably this difference is not significant because the damage was incurred at the very time that the bike rider was boiling with anger and otherwise these blows would have been directed at your passenger.
Another reason to obligate your passenger to pay is that you were obligated to do what you could in order to save your passenger from the bike rider who was running after him because of the injunction of lo sa'amod al dam rei'echo. The Rosh (Sanhedrin 8, 2) proves from the Gemara that if the person who was saved because of this injunction has money, he must reimburse his savior for his expenses because that is the nature of this injunction. The ruling of the Rosh is cited by the Tur (CM 426) and Sema (426, 1) and ruled by many others (e.g., Mordechai BK 58-59, Mahari Weill 147) including SA (YD 252, 12).
A third reason that your passenger should pay is that according to many he had the status of a sho'eil on your car since he was using your car without paying for his use and a shoeil is liable for damages that were incurred by the object that he borrowed. The Nesevos (340, 1) rules that using another person's object without paying for the use bestows upon the user the status of a sho'eil. This reason though is controversial since you benefitted from your passenger's use because you fulfilled a mitzva thereby (See Ketsos (72, 32) and Nesevos (72, 19)) and the inherent characteristic of a shoeil is that only the borrower benefitted from the loan.
In conclusion: Your passenger is obligated to reimburse you for your expenditure since you saved him from his would-be assailant.
