Question
I am Baruch Hashem a successful businessman and have been supporting various causes for many years. Baruch Hashem one of my sons is a big talmid chacham and he would like to open a Kollel of his own in order to give shiurim to the avreichim. Since he wants to continue spending his time learning full-time, he wants me to subsidize his Kollel. In order to do this, I will need to stop supporting other people and causes that I have been supporting for many years. Is there any problem with this?
Answer
Before we can answer your question, we have to first understand what could be the issue and then decide whether it poses a problem for you. We note that this is not a new issue but each situation has to be decided individually and what was true once may not be true today since there are a number of variables that affect the law.
The issue that is involved is a concept which the Gemara calls makerei kehuno, which we will presently clarify. We find in a number of situations in the Gemara that a kohein or levi who in the past would regularly receive a person’s terumo-tithe or other entitlements that the Torah granted to a kohein or levi had a certain right to continue receiving what he had regularly received in the past.
One situation where this right is exhibited is a law concerning the double portion that the first-born is entitled to receive from his father’s inheritance. The Torah writes (Devorim 21, 17) that this entitlement is limited to those assets that were possessed by the deceased at the time of his death. Thus, the first born is not entitled to a double portion from items that entered the deceased’s estate posthumously.
We recall that the Torah requires a non-kohein whose animal was slaughtered to give a kohein of his choice the right fore-leg, the tongue and the stomach of the slaughtered animal. The Gemoro (BB 123B) rules that one of the items from which the first born is entitled to receive a double portion is these parts of an animal if an animal belonging to a person who regularly gave these parts to the deceased was slaughtered prior to the kohein‘s death. Even though these parts had not been received by the deceased kohein prior to his death, his first-born is nevertheless entitled to a double-portion from these parts since at the time of his death the deceased was destined to receive these parts from this animal. Thus, this Gemara teaches us that the first-born is not only entitled to a double portion from items that were actually possessed by the deceased at the time of his death but even extends to certain assets that he was destined to receive. Tosafos explains that the reason why the first-born is entitled to a double-portion from this asset that the deceased was destined to receive and not from other such assets is that it was forbidden for the one who regularly gave these parts to this kohein to give them to a different kohein. Even though if this individual would have given these parts to a different kohein, the kohein may keep them, since this action is forbidden, the first-born is entitled to a double-portion from these parts of this animal after they were received by the estate of their deceased father.
From Tosafos and the Gemara (BM 49A), when it discusses another application of makerei kahuna, it is clear that the reason it is forbidden to cease giving to the kohein who was the regular recipient of an individual’s animal parts is because one who changes recipients is considered a mechusar amono, an unreliable individual and it is forbidden to act in a manner that is considered to be a mechusar amono. This is an extension of the class of people who are classified as a mechusar amono since the classical mechusar amono is a person who gave his word to give, sell or buy something, whereas here not a word was uttered. This Gemoro teaches us that, nevertheless, since based on past behavior the past recipient would expect to again receive these parts, if the animal’s owner gives them to a different kohein he is acting as a mechusar amono.
In all of the cases (there are 3) where the Gemara applies the concept of makerei kehuno the recipient was a kohein or levi who regularly received from a certain yisro’eil those items which a yisro’eil is obligated to give some kohein or levi. However, the consensus of the Poskim (e.g., Rambam, as explained by Mishna Lamelech (Ma’aseir 7, 6)) is that it applies even to the tenth of the crop that must be given to a poor person in the third and sixth year of the Shmitta cycle and even (Shach (YD 257, 11), Chasam Sofer (res. YD 237)) to ordinary tsedoko.
Since we have determined that there is a concept of makerei kehuno even concerning the tsedoko which a person gives, your question is whether given your situation, the institutions and poor who you have been supporting regularly have a claim that you must continue their support. Furthermore, we have determined the nature of the possible claim. It is not that you would be stealing their money but you would perhaps be acting in a manner that is considered to be a mechusar amono.
One issue that concerns this prohibition is the stage where this prohibition kicks-in. We have seen in the case of the slaughtered animal that the first-born is entitled to a double portion only if the animal was slaughtered prior to the deceased’s death. Thus, perhaps you are allowed to change your preference for monies that had not been set aside for tsedoko prior to your change of preferences. Several major opinions maintain that this is permitted. Thus, the Ritvo (BB 123B) writes that only after the tithe was set aside by the owner, he is required to give it to the kohein who regularly received it in the past and this is ruled by the Pri Yitzchok (1, 49). According to this opinion any monies that you will set aside following your change of preferences may be given to your son’s Kollel.
However, there are opinions that disagree. A famous and very controversial dispute concerning precisely this issue cropped up in the 1860s. Many of those who had emigrated to Eretz Yisroeil from Europe lived in dire poverty and were supported by the tsedoko of those who remained in Europe. The poor were divided based on their country of origin and the funds that were received were divided based on the country of the donors. Until that time the poor of Austria and Hungary were considered as one unit (This was at the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire.) but at that time the Hungarians wanted to separate from the Austrians and form their own fund against the wishes of the Austrians and the issue was brought to the gedolim to decide.
The basic ruling was issued by the Beis Shlomo (YD 2, 99) in 1862 who ruled that the Hungarians may not secede. One of his reasons is that this would endanger the lives of the Austrians since their support would dwindle drastically. However, besides this he ruled that the Hungarian donors who had donated to the fund in the past were required to keep supporting the Austrians who had received their support in the past because of makerei kehuno. Thus, we see that he maintained that donors may not change their preferences even before they set aside money for tsedoko. Many gedolim (e.g., Imrei Yosher, Maharsham, Beis Yitzchok) agreed with the Beis Shlomo but others disagreed.
Thus, according to some poskim you would not have a problem since you are allowed to change your preferences before you set aside your tsedoko.
There are other reasons to be lenient based on the nature of the prohibition. As we saw before, the prohibition is that it is prohibited to act as a mechusar amono. The nature of the prohibition is that one is not allowed to act in manner that violates a person’s justified confidence. In the usual case, a person gave his word which inspired the confidence of the beneficiary that he would keep his verbal commitment. Makerei kehuno is special in that even if one didn’t say anything, since people relied on him that he would continue giving them what he gave them previously he may not violate their confidence.
Based on this, there is a vast difference between the case discussed by the Beis Shlomo and the situation today. The Beis Shlomo’s ruling was rendered in reference to people who totally relied on the funds that received from the Jews in Europe. However, today poor people or institutions generally do not rely on a person’s support. They realize that many factors may cause a donor to cease his support. Therefore, it would seem that under today’s circumstances in most cases you would not violate this prohibition by ceasing your support.
A third reason to be lenient is also based on the laws of mechusar amono. The reason that you would not be a mechusar amono is that circumstances have changed drastically from the time when you made your commitment. In the past you did not have a son who had a Kollel that required your support. Since this is a vast difference in circumstances even those who rule that one is classified as a mechusar amono if he changed his mind because prices changed, would agree that in your situation you would not be a mechusar amono. Your situation is analogous to a case where the price changed in an unusual unexpected manner where the consensus (See Mishpatei Yosher vol. 1 page 378) is that one is not a mechusar amono if he changes his mind.
In conclusion: In your situation you may stop giving to places and individuals you helped in the past in order to support your son’s Kollel. Perhaps, you should continue supporting those people or causes that rely heavily on your benevolence until they find other means of support.
