Question
We had a case in beis din concerning a wealthy person whom we will call Reuvein and a gabbai tsedoko whom we will call Shimon. Before Purim, Reuvein gave Shimon his credit card and told Shimon to use it to distribute one hundred thousand dollars as matanos le'evyonim on Purim. The gabbai tried using the card on Purim but it did not work. When the gabbai tried to call Reuvein he couldn't get him. Since he knew Reuvein for many years as a wealthy and honest person, Shimon distributed a hundred thousand dollars of matanos le'evyonim from his gemach on behalf of Reuvein. After Purim, Shimon told Reuvein what happened and asked Reuvein to refund the gemach the money that the gemach lent to him. Reuvein replied that he will only return the money if he fulfilled the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim with the money that Shimon laid out from the gemach since the only reason he wanted to distribute so much money on Purim was to fulfill the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim. Can we tell Reuvein that he fulfilled the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim?
Answer
We will first clarify whether Reuvein fulfilled the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim and then we will examine if his claim that he is not obligated to repay if he did not fulfill the mitzvah is correct.
The basis for thinking that once Shimon gave money on behalf of Reuvein, Reuvein fulfilled the mitzvah just as if Reuvein gave his own money, is a law of the Torah concerning a non-Jewish slave who is owned by a Jew (eved Cana'ani). The Mishna (Kiddushin 22B) rules that even though a slave cannot own any money, since any money he acquires automatically becomes the property of his master (ma shekono eved kono rabbo), nevertheless, if someone gives his master money on his behalf, the slave becomes free because he was redeemed by the other person.
From this law, the Gemara (Kiddushin 7A) derives that if a person gives a woman money on behalf of a man who wishes to marry her, she becomes married to that man if the man says to her that he is marrying her with the money that other person gave her. Even though in order to legally marry a woman it is necessary for the man himself to give the woman money – or something that is worth money – that belongs to him, it suffices if someone else gave the woman money on behalf of the man even though the man never owned the money. This law is derived from the Torah ruling concerning the freeing of a non-Jewish slave when someone else gives the master money, so this law is called din eved Cana'ani.
Thus, it is plausible that for matanos le'evyonim too, if someone else like Shimon gave money to a poor person on behalf of Reuvein, it is valid as if Reuvein himself gave the money to the poor person.
However, it is not clear that this works for mitzvahs like matanos le'evyonim. The source of this differentiation is a responsum of the Nesivos to the Chemdas Shlomo (YD 32). The issue that concerned them was an orphan whose father passed away before he gave money to a kohein for his son's pidyon haben. The issue was whether someone else can give the kohein money on behalf of the child on the basis of din eved Cana'ani. The Nesivos ruled that one cannot, because the principle of eved Cana'ani only applies when one wants to acquire something like a wife or a slave. That is all one can derive from the Torah's principle concerning redeeming a slave. He maintains that this does not suffice if giving the money is to fulfill a mitzvah since one must perform a mitzvah himself and not have someone else perform the mitzvah on his behalf. For example, one does not fulfill the mitzvah of wearing tefillin if someone else dons tefillin on his behalf.
This is a very common issue concerning matanos le'evyonim. The issue comes up when a husband gives matanos le'evyonim on behalf of his wife. The Ramo (695, 4) rules that women are commanded to fulfill the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim just like men. The Magein Avrohom (695, 14) notes that it was not common in his days for married woman to give matanos le'evyonim. However, he rules that one should be stringent and his ruling is cited by the Mishnah Berurah (695, 25). Furthermore, both the Kitsur Shulchan Aruch (142, 4) and the Chaye Odom (155, 33) rule this way and add that some women rely on their husband to give on their behalf but "it is not proper."
Modern day poskim dispute whether a man can utilize the law of eved Cana'ani for a husband to give money to a poor person on behalf of his wife. Notable among those who were stringent is Rav Eliashev. (He ruled that way many times-see Yevakshu Mepihu (6, 1).) He based his stringent approach on this ruling of the Nesivos. However, others like Rav S. Z. Auerbach (Halichos Shlomo 19, 17) and Rav Chaim Kaniefsky (cited in Orach Tsedoko) were lenient. Moreover, the Shoshanas Yisroeil (page 132) cites Rav Shlomo Miller as maintaining that matanos le'evyonim is different from pidyon haben since the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim is to enable the poor to enjoy Purim. Therefore, even one who causes them to be happy by causing someone to give them money personally fulfills the mitzvah.
We note that even according to Rav Eliashev a married woman can easily fulfill the mitzvah because the only problem is if the husband gives his own money with the intention that his wife should thereby fulfill the mitzvah. If the wife herself gives money to a poor person even if the money belongs to her husband (if it's not too much, or even a lot if the husband expressly permits) or, if the husband gives his wife money and she gives it back to him to distribute, or, if he gives it to a poor person and tells him that he is giving it on behalf of his wife – in these cases even according to Rav Eliashev the wife fulfills the mitzvah.
Since there is a dispute whether one fulfills the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim by utilizing the din of eved Cana'ani we have to examine if that is what actually transpired in this case. Here the gabbai did not give his own money to poor people in order for Reuvein to fulfill the mitzvah as in the cases cited above. Rather, the gabbai intended to extend a loan to Reuvein. Since Reuvein will have to repay the money that the gabbai laid out on his behalf, perhaps it is considered as if Reuvein himself gave the money.
This differentiation is the subject of a dispute between the Ketsos (CM 190, 2) who maintains that one must still utilize the din of eved Cana'ani since the money was not owned by the borrower at the time it was given to the recipient, and the Nesivos (190, 3) who maintains that the one who is giving the money is actually Reuvein himself since he will have to repay.
The Miluei Mishpot (note 3) comments that the position of the Nesivos seems difficult because at the time that the money was given it did not yet belong to the borrower. Nonetheless, he agrees that if the one who laid out the money was an agent one can understand the position of the Nesivos. Since in your case the gabbai who laid out the money was Re'uvein's agent, this condition is satisfied. The Shoshanas Yisro'eil (page 133) says that there are indications that the Chazon Ish (YD 71, 2-3) and Machane Efraim (Shluchim 24) agree with the Nesivos.
Thus, we have seen that according to many opinions Reuvein did fulfill the mitzvah of matanos le'evyonim. The reason is because according to many poskim one may utilize the din of eved Cana'ani in order to fulfill this mitzvah and even according to those who maintain that one may not use the din of eved Cana'ani, since this was intended as a loan, the money that the gabbai laid out was Reuvein's and thus Reuvein certainly fulfilled the mitzvah.
All of the above determines whether Reuvein actually fulfilled the mitzvah. We will now study whether Reuvein may stipulate that he will only repay the gabbai if he fulfilled the mitzvah.
We find in the Gemara in a number of places that if an agent deviated from a detail that was specified at the time of his appointment, his action is nevertheless binding on the one who appointed him if it is clear that the detail was not important. For example, the Mishna (Gittin 65A) records a dispute when a woman appoints an agent to receive her get in a certain location and the agent received the get in a different location. One opinion is that the agent's action is valid and she was divorced and the other opinion is that his action is invalid. Most importantly, the Gemara explains that the essence of their dispute is whether the place where the get is given is important for the woman. Everyone agrees that if the place was not overly important the agent's action is valid and the woman is divorced.
Returning to your case we note that what the gabbai actually did was essentially the same as what Reuvein originally asked him to do. Reuvein did not give the gabbai money but told him to charge his credit card. When one uses a credit card, the credit card company actually pays the money and the holder of the card thereby becomes obligated to reimburse the credit card company. Therefore, what the gabbai did when he laid out money on behalf of Reuvein is essentially the same as what Reuvein asked him to do with the only difference being the identity of the lender.
Since the gabbai fulfilled the task that was assigned to him, Reuvein is obligated to reimburse him for any money that the gabbai laid out on his behalf. Even if Reuvein wanted to use his credit card to earn points, if he can earn the same points when he repays the gabbai with his credit card, the change is insignificant. Even if he cannot earn the points for some reason, since he was willing to spend so much money on matanos le'evyonim earning points seems a minor detail.
In conclusion: Reuvein is certainly obligated to repay the gabbai regardless of whether he fulfilled the mitzvah, since the gabbai fulfilled the essential mission that Reuvein assigned him to perform on his behalf. Moreover, according to many opinions, Reuvein did fulfill the mitzvah.
