Question
I work for a taxi company. Recently, I drove a chassidishe couple on a two-day trip to the north of Israel. When the couple asked our company to provide them with a driver, they stipulated that they wanted a driver who does not understand Yiddish. I told my boss that I don't understand Yiddish and he assigned me the job. In fact, I do understand Yiddish, and at times I overheard and understood their conversation. But I did not hear any secrets and I never revealed to them that I understand Yiddish. My conscience started bothering me that perhaps I am not entitled to payment for this trip since if they had known that I understand Yiddish they would not have traveled with me. Do I have to return their money?
Answer
First, it should be stressed that you acted improperly. There are specific situations where one is allowed to lie and this is not one of them. One is not allowed to lie in order to earn extra money.
However, whether you must return the money depends on other considerations. As we discussed in the past, there are two classes of people that one needs to pay if they worked for him. One is a hired worker who has the status of a po'eil, and the other is a non-hired-worker who has the status of a yoreid.
There are several differences between them, often including the amount of compensation that they are entitled to. Therefore, we will first consider what you are entitled to if you were a po'eil-a hired worker, and then what you are entitled to if you have the status of a yoreid.
It might seem that you are not entitled to any renumeration as a po'eil, since you did not fulfill the conditions that the couple stipulated when they hired you. However, since they didn't discuss any private information and merely wanted to converse freely, they received what they really wanted. It was not in the way they envisioned but, nevertheless, they got what they wanted. The question is thus: must a condition be fulfilled in the exact manner that it was stated, or does it suffice if the intent of the condition was met?
This issue is discussed by the Gemara (Gittin 74 B) in a different context. The Gemara rules that if a person grants a divorce to his wife on condition that his wife give him two hundred zuz and subsequently changes his mind after he already gave her the get and states that he is willing to waive payment of the two hundred zuz, she must still give him the two hundred zuz since the get was only given on this condition and one cannot retroactively change his mind.
The Gemara then discusses a case where A vowed that B may not derive any benefit from him and his possessions unless B gives a specific amount of wheat and wine to his son. The Gemara rules that in this case if A later says that B need not do this, B is not obligated to fulfill the condition.
The Gemara questions the discrepancy between these two rulings. The Gemara answers that there is a difference in the intention of the imposed conditions.
In the case of the divorce, we understand that the intention of the husband in requiring his ex-wife to give him two hundred zuz was to make life more difficult for the wife he was divorcing and not to receive extra money. Therefore, he cannot afterwards change his wife's obligation because once the condition is imposed it must be fulfilled and cannot be canceled.
However, where A conditioned B's use of his property on B giving his son wheat and wine, his intention was to get his dependent son (explanation of the Rashbo and others to Nedorim 24A) wheat and wine in order to ease his own financial burden in supporting his son. Therefore, if he subsequently says that he does not need the money the condition was fulfilled since his goal was to fulfill a need and that need was filled by other means. If there is no longer a need, his condition has been fulfilled.
What is important for our discussion is that even though in both cases the statement of the condition was similar, nevertheless, what is crucial is the intent of the condition. In fact, there is even an opinion (cited by Ran (Nedorim 24A) and brought by the Ramo (YD 232, 20)) that if A vowed that B may not derive any benefit from him or his property if B goes to a certain place and B went there in violation of this condition, A can remove this condition retroactively by saying that as far as he is concerned it is as if B did not go. The reason is that A's intention was that his desire be fulfilled and it was. Again, we see that intention and not the literal statement is the critical factor.
Another instance where we see that the critical factor is intention involves employment. The issue was whether an older person who had a white beard and was seeking employment may dye his beard black to give the impression that he was younger than his true age. This might be a Biblical violation of the issur of ono'o because he is misleading whoever eventually hires him since the employer would not have hired him if he had been aware of his true age. (There is another issue of lo yilbash-that it forbidden for a man to act in a lady-like manner but that is not relevant to our question.)
This question was posed to the Sefer Hamo'or (Preil, responsum 26), the Rov of Elizabeth, N.J. He ruled that since this was just an issue of employment and age did not really not make a difference to the employer (in this case) because the employee was fully capable of performing the job that he was being hired for, there is nothing wrong with misleading him. Thus, we see again that what really is important is the intent of the one who imposes the condition. Therefore, even though the employer never waived the condition, nevertheless, since the condition was essentially fulfilled, the fact that it was not fulfilled in the stated manner is not important.
The Sefer Hamo'or sent the question with his answer to Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggros Moshe YD 2, 61) and the Levush Mordechai (Slabodka, 24). Both of these gedolim concurred with this answer and rationale. Rav Moshe writes that it is permitted as long as the employee honestly knows that he is as suitable for the job as a younger person.
Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein (Chashukei Chemed Chulin 58 A) discusses a somewhat similar question. In his situation, a security guard was hired to watch over a group of American tourists at a time when there were numerous terror attacks by Arabs. The guard guarded them with his gun but after he was paid, he realized that he had forgotten his ammunition at home. The question was whether he was entitled to his full salary. One of the reasons that he gives that he is entitled to his full salary is that the reason the guard was hired was so that the group should feel secure and they, being unaware of the facts, felt comfortable. (This is debatable.)
Rav Zilberstein posed his question to Rav Chaim Kaniefsky zatsal who answered that he certainly is entitled to be paid for the benefit that the group derived from his presence in this manner. The meaning of this ruling is that Rav Chaim argued that it could be that the guard was not entitled to a salary as an employee, but since the group definitely benefited from his presence, they nevertheless, must pay him as a yoreid-a non-hired employee, as is the general rule by a yoreid. (This does not imply that you are not entitled to a salary as an employee since each case is different.)
Returning to your question, if they had discussed private information, you would not be entitled to a salary as an employee because their intention was that the driver should not know what they discussed and you did not fulfill their condition. However, if they just engaged in general conversation and only imposed this condition in order to feel comfortable, since their intention was achieved, you are entitled to a salary as an employee.
Additionally, in your situation, since they did not pay extra in order to have a driver who does not understand Yiddish you would be entitled to the entire amount that you received anyway, since you did drive them and they only paid you the amount that they would need to pay to any driver. Therefore, even if you do not have the status of an employee, you are entitled to the full amount since, in your situation, as a yoreid you are still entitled to the full amount.
There are differences between these two reasons since the laws governing an employee and a yoreid are different. For example, there is a prohibition from the Torah to pay an employee late, but there is no such prohibition with regard to a yoreid. However, this, as well as the other differences, are not relevant in your case.
In conclusion: There are two reasons that you are entitled to the entire amount that you received. First of all, you actually fulfilled the condition that the couple imposed. Secondly even if that was not the case, you are entitled to the entire amount that you received.
We note that had the couple paid extra for a driver who does not understand Yiddish, you would have to return the additional amount. This is because the second reason certainly does not apply since as a yoreid you only deserve the amount that one normally pays, since that is the value of the benefit that the couple received. As an employee you would also not be entitled to the additional amount since the payment was for the additional effort to find a non-Yiddish-speaking driver.
We reiterate that your behavior was improper, as we stated at the outset, but you are entitled to the money.
