Question
I was offered seven hundred dollars to write summaries of the first twenty-six chapters of Sefer Yirmiya. As I have taught Yirmiya many times and know it well, I used AI to write the summaries and I just checked for errors and made a number of corrections which took me about three hours to do. The price that I was offered is normal for this type of work but I don't think that my employer would have offered me this amount if he had known that I was going to finish the job in three hours. Must I return money to my employer?
Answer
There are two issues that we will examine: First we will examine the question whether if you indeed overcharged must you return any money or not. Then we will examine whether Torah law considers as having overcharged.
In order to determine if, assuming you overcharged you must return money, we must first determine the nature of your relationship with your employer.
In Torah (explained by the Maharam of Rottenberg, res. Prague 477 and ruled by the Ramo 333, 5) law there are two types of employees: One type is an employee who can choose his own hours and whose remuneration is based on the task he accomplishes who is called a kablan. The second type is an employee who must work fixed hours and he is known as a sochir. Since you were offered money to accomplish a task and were free to set your own hours you were working as a kablan. Even if you had to meet a deadline the consensus (Chasam Sofer BM 77B, Tifferes Lemoshe YD 380 but the Nesivos (264, 8) is uncertain) is that you are nevertheless considered a kablan.
One reason you might have to return money after a transaction is if the transaction violated ono'o-overcharging. The rule of ono'o is that if one overcharges by less than one sixth the transaction remains as is. If the overcharge was a sixth then the one who was overcharged can demand a return of the excessive charge. If the overcharge was more than a sixth the one who was overcharged can cancel the transaction.
The Torah writes the laws of ono'o with regard to sales. This teaches us that the laws of ono'o apply only to sales. The Gemara (BM 56B) clarifies that rentals are sales, deriving from a pasuk that as far as the laws of ono'o are concerned (The Rishonim dispute whether this is true for other Torah laws.) rentals are viewed as temporary sales and therefore, the laws of ono'o apply to rentals.
When one hires a worker, some Rishonim, including the Rambam, view the employment agreement as an agreement to rent the worker for his services. Thus, the laws of ono'o can apply to a worker's wages.
The Mishna (BM 56A) states, based on a pasuk, that the laws of ono'o do not apply to sales of real property and slaves. Therefore, many Rishonim, including the Rambam, rule that the laws of ono'o do not apply to many employment agreements.
The position of the Rambam is that employment is a type of rental of a person and therefore, employment agreements are subject to the rules of ono'o. Therefore, the Rambam (Mechiro 13, 18) rules that the rules of ono'o apply to employment agreements with a kablan. However, for employment agreements with a socheir the Rambam (Mechiro 13, 15) writes, "The laws of ono'o do not apply when one hires an employee since he is buying him temporarily and the laws of ono'o do not apply when one purchases a slave."
The Terumas Hadeshen (1, 318) explains that the Rambam's rationale is that only workers who must work for fixed hours i.e., sechirim are comparable to slaves since during the hours they must work they are not independent. In contrast, one who is a kablan, who is free to choose his own hours, is not comparable to a slave and therefore, the laws of ono'o do apply.
Many Rishonim including the Ramban and Ritvo (BM 56B) follow a different approach. They maintain that when the Gemara rules that rentals are temporary sales it refers only to rental of objects. But when one hires a worker, he does not buy the worker even temporarily. Therefore, they rule that since the laws of ono'o apply only to sales, even workers who work as a kablan are not subject to the laws of ono'o.
The Ritvo cites as proof the ruling of the Gemara (Yevamos 106A) that if one who escaped from jail agrees to pay a ferry owner an exorbitant amount, he must pay (unless the fugitive can claim that he never meant to pay in the first place). This shows that the fugitive is not a victim of ono'o even if he has to pay more than an additional sixth of the normal price.
As we clarified, according to many you were a kablan. Therefore, according to many Rishonim the laws of ono'o do not apply to your agreement.
However, according to the Rambam whose approach is ruled by the SA (228, 36) without dispute, the rules of ono'o do apply. Even though the SA does not record any dissenting opinions, Rabbi Akiva Eiger (glosses) does bring some and the Pischei Choshen (Sechirus 8, footnote 9) rules that one can say kim li like those opinions since many Rishonim disagree with the Rambam.
Thus, if you were already paid you can say kim li even if you overcharged, and you will not be obligated to return money to your employer.
It should be stressed that we have determined only the issue that even if you overcharged you are not required to return any money, which was your question. However, besides the monetary issue there is a prohibition against overcharging that also depends on this dispute. According to the Rambam you would have violated a Torah prohibition if you overcharged. According to the other opinion you did not violate the negative prohibition to overcharge since the prohibition applies only to sales and according to them this was not a sale.
We will now turn to the second issue, namely, whether by finishing the job in three hours by using AI you overcharged. For two reasons it seems that you did not overcharge.
One reason is that, as you wrote in your question, one must check over what AI produces since often there are mistakes. If you had not known Yirmiya very well you would not have been able to finish in three hours. Therefore, while people usually are not paid so much for working for three hours, you were able to earn so much due to your knowledge. Thus, we must investigate whether one who charges more because of his knowledge is considered overcharging.
One situation where this issue comes up in halacha concerns doctors. The Gemara (Yevamos 106A) rules that if someone overcharges one who desperately requires his services the one who used the service can later refuse to pay the overcharge with the claim that he never seriously meant to pay (meshateh hoyisy) and only agreed to pay because he was desperate.
For example, in the case cited earlier of the person who agreed to overpay the ferry owner because he was desperate to avoid capture, the fugitive can avoid paying the overcharge by claiming that he never intended to pay such an exorbitant amount.
A question that was discussed by Rishonim concerned doctors who charged an exorbitant amount which people agreed to pay because they were desperate to be cured. The Tur (YD 336) rules that, unlike the escaped prisoner, one who agrees to pay a doctor an exorbitant amount must pay in any case because the doctor is charging for his knowledge and the Ramban (Toras Ho'odom) writes that knowledge is priceless.
Similarly, where you just took advantage of your knowledge to work much faster than expected, what you charged does not constitute ono'o.
An interesting use of the principle that knowledge is worth money is found in a Gemara that discusses nezirim. The Yerushalmi (Nozir 54) recounts that in the time of Shimon ben Shetach (second Beis Hamikdosh) there were three hundred poor nezirim who could not afford the cost of the korbonos that they were required to bring in order to terminate their nezirus. (Each nozir requires three korbonos.) Rav Shimon ben Shetach approached his brother-in-law, King Yannai, and offered to split with him the cost of the nine hundred korbonos that were needed. The King agreed and paid for four hundred-fifty animals. Shimon ben Shetach did not pay for any korbonos and just found a way to annul the nezirus retroactively for one hundred-fifty nezirim. When King Yannai complained that Shimon ben Shetach did not keep his part of the agreement, Shimon replied that you gave your money and I gave my knowledge. He cited a pasuk to prove that knowledge is worth money. Thus, we see that one may use his knowledge in lieu of payment. Similarly, you used your knowledge in lieu of spending time.
It is important to stress that what Shimon ben Shetach meant was that knowledge is worth money. This can be illustrated by the following question which seems quite similar to your question but is different. A Rov was asked to decide a dispute between a gabbai and congregant A. The shul was very busy and over Succos many seforim were left all over the shul. Realizing the tedious work that lay ahead of the gabbai, A offered the gabbai that for five hundred shekels he would straighten up the shul and the gabbai agreed thinking that A would do the work himself. A got up after Ma'ariv on Motsai Simchas Torah and spoke about the importance of honoring seforim and returning them to their place and asked each one present to just return five seforim to their place. The congregants complied and within a few minutes everything was returned. When A asked the gabbai for his five hundred shekels the gabbai refused to pay, arguing that A did not do the job. They went to a Rov.
The Rov wanted to rule in favor of A because he compared A's behavior to that of Rav Shimon ben Shetach. However, this seems to be an incorrect application because what A did, did not require any skill or knowledge. Shimon ben Shetach only proved from a pasuk that knowledge was worth money but not that one deserves full pay for accomplishing any job that otherwise would have cost money.
A second reason why your charge is not ono'o is that people are aware of AI and its use. If your employer did not ask if you will use AI, it indicates that he did not care. This is similar to the Gemara (BM 77A) about a person who hired workers to irrigate his field and then the river from which the workers were supposed to draw the water dried up. The Gemara rules that if the owner of the field was aware that sometimes the river dries up and the workers were unaware of that fact, the owner must pay the workers as if they had worked, because he should have stipulated that their employment is conditioned on the river flowing.
Similarly, since people are aware of AI, the fact that your employer did not stipulate that you work without AI indicates that he didn't want to condition your salary on your working without AI.
In conclusion: You do not owe any money because: first, you did not overcharge, and second, even if you overcharged, you would not owe anything. Furthermore, since you did not overcharge you did not violate any negative prohibition.
